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ABSTRACT 
The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 brought 
into effect major changes to New Zealand's mental health laws. These 
changes are the product of a long period of gestation. 
The Act deals only with those patients who are deemed in need of compulsory 
care and treatment. At the core of the Act lies the compulsory treatment order. 
Part One of the paper examines in detail the criteria which must be satisfied 
before a court may impose a compulsory treatment order. 
Part Two reviews the mechanisms for review which achieve significance after 
a compulsory treatment order has been imposed. 
Part Three discusses the type of compulsory treatment order in favour of which 
there exists a presumption - the community treatment order - and the theory 
behind its creation. 
The writer concludes that a number of the provisions establishing and relating 
to the compulsory treatment order, though much improved, are to varying 
degrees of seriousness defective and in need of amendment. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 17,000 words. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The enactment of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) 
Act 1992 is a significant step for New Zealand mental health law. Although 
a substantially original piece of legislation, it follows international trends in 
reforming mental health laws to accommodate civil rights concerns and to 
attempt to provide greater protection to those persons subject to coercive State 
powers by reason of their mental state. 
The new provisions bring with them new terminology. Reception orders have 
been replaced by compulsory treatment orders and committed patients are now 
patients subject to compulsory status. 
The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative, although not expressly enacted, 
represents the broad ideology and motivation behind the Act The Act's 
compulsory powers are to be invoked as a last resort only. 
More specifically, the doctrine also permeates the mechanisms within the Act. 
The imposition of a compulsory treatment order is not taken lightly. A new 
definition of mental disorder is laid down in an attempt to clarify and narrow 
the class of persons whose rights the State is justified in breaching. Imposition 
of a compulsory treatment order is not automatic upon satisfaction of the 
definition. The court must also be satisfied that, in all the circumstances of the 
case, such an order is necessary. 
Mechanisms to determine whether the order continues to be justified have also 
been enacted in the form of more comprehensive avenues for ongoing review 
of the patient's status. 
Perhaps the most overt embodiment of the least restrictive alternative doctrine 
is the creation of the community treatment order. Its enactment creates a 
2 
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presumption, when compulsory treatment is required, in favour of the patient's 
care and treatment in the community. 
This paper will examine these three statutory embodiments of the least 
restrictive alternative doctrine, that is, the imposition of a compulsory 
treatment order, the review or removal of a compulsory treatment order and the 
likely form of a compulsory treatment order - a community treatment order. 
Due to the fact that the Act is unique and still in its infancy, the relevant case 
law is limited. That which is relevant will be examined. The primary focus 
will of necessity, however, be on a close examination of the legislative 
provisions. 
The legitimacy of compulsory treatment will not be challenged. The paper 
will be based on the assumption that it is, in some instances, a necessary part 
of mental health practice. 
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PART ONE 
THE IMPOSITION OF A 
COMPULSORY TREATMENT ORDER 
1 Introduction 
Under the Mental Health ( Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
("the Act" or "the MH(CAT) Act 1992"), anyone who is 18 years of age or 
older may make an application to the Director of Area Mental Health 
Services1 for the assessment of any person whom they believe to be mentally 
disordered. 2 A detailed assessment and treatment procedure may then be 
undertaken. This procedure contains extensive safeguards for the person 
alleged to be mentally disordered.3 If, upon the conclusion of that procedure, 
it is found that the person requires further treatment, the responsible clinician 
("RC")4 must apply to the court' for a compulsory treatment order. 
Before a compulsory treatment order may be imposed on a person, the court 
must be satisfied that: 
a) the person concerned suffers from a mental disorder; and 
b) a compulsory treatment order is necessary in all the circumstances of 
the case.6 
Each of these limbs will be examined in turn. 
Defined in s2(1) as amended by the Fourth Schedule to the Health Reforms 
(Transitional Provisions) Act 1993. 
2 Section 8. 
3 The assessment procedure will not be dealt with due to space constraints. Appendix 
A outlines the procedure in diagram form. 
4 'Responsible clinician' is defined in s2. 
5 In s2, 'Court' means a District Court. 
6 Section 27. 
4 
2 The Definition of Mental Disorder 
A Introduction 
The meaning of mental disorder is a core component of the Act. Its definition 
provides the initial threshold which must be reached before the possibility of 
the imposition of compulsory treatment and its resultant loss of basic human 
rights arises. When viewed in this way, the importance of a clear and 
appropriate definition of what constitutes a mental disorder is obvious. 
Attempts at definition have, however, proved problematic for legislative 
drafters both here and overseas. The term 'mental disorder' potentially 
encompasses a broad range of possible disorders. Indeed, the purpose of the 
Act is to catch all types of mental illness which meet the particular criteria. 
Too great a degree of specificity is not possible without defeating this purpose. 
On the other hand, too vague or broad a definition is undesirable in an Act 
which is also an attempt to minimalise coercion. Due to such difficulties, 
mental disorder has been left without statutory definition in many jurisdictions. 
New Zealand mental health laws have, however, always contained a definition 
of some sort. Under the Mental Health Act 1969 (which was repealed by the 
1992 Act), mental disorder was defined as:7 
7 Section 2. 
"a psychiatric or other disorder, whether continuous or episodic, that 
substantially impairs mental health, so that the person belongs to one 
or more of the following classes, namely: 
a) Mentally ill - that is, requiring care and treatment for mental 
illness; 
5 
b) Mentally infirm - that is, requiring care and treatment by 
reason of mental infirmity arising from age or deterioration 
of or injury to the brain; 
c) Mentally subnormal - that is, suffering from subnorrnality of 
intelligence as a result of arrested or incomplete development 
of mind." 
The above definition was extremely wide. In addition to those suffering from 
psychiatric illnesses, it clearly encompassed the intellectually disabled. 
Further, the definition of 'mentally ill' was a circular one, that is, the meaning 
of the term 'mentally ill' was explained by almost exclusive reference to itself. 
The 1992 Act introduces a completely new definition of mental disordered and 
one that is unique to this country. 
Section 2 states that a mental disorder is: 
"an abnormal state of mind, whether of a continuous or an 
intermittent nature, which is characterized by delusions or by 
disorders of mood, volition, cognition or perception of such a degree 
that it 
a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of the person or 
of others; or 
b) seriously diminishes the capacity of the person to take care of 
himself or herself; 
and 'mentally disordered', in relation to any such person, has a corresponding 
meaning." 
There are 2 separate limbs of the definition which must be satisfied before a 
person can be deemed to be mentally disordered. These have been described 
as the qualitative limb and the quantitative limb.8 
8 NZ Parliamentary debates Part 38, 1992: 6860, 6861-6862. 
6 
The first limb requires an 'abnormal state of mind'. This may be continuous 
or intermittent and must be represented by "specified symptoms or 
phenomena" .9 The second and quantitative limb lays down the "resultant 
outcomes" 10 which must be produced by this abnormal state of mind. These 
outcomes are expressed in terms of serious danger to others or serious danger 
to or diminished capacity for care of the person labouring under the abnormal 
state of mind himself/herself. Therefore, an abnormal state of mind or what 
may be considered in common parlance to be a 'mental illness' is no longer 
sufficient to bring a person within the definition of mental disorder. The 
definition is much more than a diagnosis of mental illness. Although terms 
contained in the first limb still leave much scope for interpretation, 11 the 
second limb has, at least in theory, a considerable narrowing effect on the 
definition. Resultant outcomes are actually incorporated into the definition of 
mental disorder. The new definition also escapes the internal circularity of the 
previous one. 
Describing mental disorder in terms of its characteristics rather than breaking 
it down into particular categories should also simplify determinations as to 
whether a mental disorder exists for non-medical decision-makers under the 
Act 
In contrast to the position under the 1969 Act, the State now has no power to 
deal compulsorily with the confused elderly or the intellectually disabled 
simply by reason of the existence of that status. 
9 New Zealand Law Society Seminar The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. Leaders: John Dawson, Dr Jeremy Anderson, Stephen 
McCarthy, Feb-March 1993, p 20. 
10 Above n 9. 
11 See below Part One, No 2B (i) and (ii) for a discussion of these terms. 
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This division of psychiatric illness and intellectual disability reflects attitudinal 
and policy changes towards the two groups. Intellectual disability has become 
"more associated with educational, welfare and disability services and 
legislation"12 while the current concern in the psychiatric area is to focus on 
treatment and recovery. 
One of the key objectives of the new Act is to prevent prolonged and 
unnecessary detention or constraints thereby minimising the infringements on 
an individual's civil liberties. The condition of the intellectually disabled or 
those who are deteriorating mentally due solely to the aging process is not 
likely to improve through compulsory detention and/or treatment. Dealing 
compulsorily with these people is therefore incongruous with this objective. 
Under the previous Act, a different definition of mental disorder applied to 
those under the age of 18. The same definition now applies to everyone. 
B The Component Parts 
(i) Abnormal State of Mind 
'Abnormal state of mind' is not itself statutorily defined. Although the 
decision whether to impose a compulsory treatment order and, therefore, a 
determination as to the presence or absence of an abnormal state of mind is a 
judicial decision, it may be expected that such a determination would 
nevertheless be made in reliance on medical opinion. Dawson13 states that 
there is no doubt that the phrase encompasses the major psychotic mental 
12 Brunton, Warwick "Mental Health Law in New Zealand: Some Sources and 
Traditions" in Abbott, M and Dawson, J (eds) The Future of Mental Health Services 
in New Zealand: Mental Health Law, Volume 1 of the Edited Proceedings of Mental 
Health Foundation of New Zealand's 1985 Conference (1985, Mental Health 
Foundation of New Zealand, Parnell, Auckland) p 51. 
13 Above n 9, p 21. 
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illnesses (such as the schizophrenias, major depression, paranoia and mania) 
and the major organic mental disorders. 14 Its meaning, however, is not linked 
to any "diagnostic system or nomenclature". It was for this reason that Judge 
McElrea in R v T (a mental patient}'5 felt able to conclude that intellectual 
disability ('mental retardation' was accepted in the case as the preferred 
terminology and will be the terminology employed in the paper from this 
point) is an abnormal state of mind. This was despite contrary expert opinion 
that mental retardation is not a 'state of mind' at all. The Judge emphasised 
that, because the legislative definition does not consist of established medical 
terminology,16 the Court must interpret the section in accordance with 
ordinary parlance and not in a narrow or technical sense. He held that, on the 
ordinary meaning of the words 'an abnormal state of mind' includes an 
unusual condition of the mind. 
It is undoubtedly true that the legislature did not intend the courts to ascribe 
technical, medical meanings to the terms comprising the definition. 'Mental 
disorder' is a legal creation to be given a legal interpretation. With respect, 
however, the writer believes that there is a danger in making general 
statements in respect of provisions legitimising coercion to the effect that they 
should not be construed narrowly. Statutory provisions which restrict basic 
human rights must be read in a way which causes the least possible restriction 
of those rights. 17 
The definition of mental disorder states that the abnormal state of mind may 
be of a continuous or an intermittent nature. This element acknowledges that 
14 Above n 9, p 21. 
15 R v T (a mental patient) (1993) 10 FRNZ 195. For a detailed discussion of the case, 
see below Part One, No 3. 
16 See below Part One, No 2B (ii), p 10. 
17 This statement is consistent with the approach taken in s6 NZBORA. 
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a mental disorder may not be a constant, unchanging condition. It ensures that 
the definition does not cease to apply to those who remain mentally ill and 
who continue to require compulsory treatment but who have temporarily 
ceased to exhibit outward signs of their mental illness. There is a danger here, 
however, that a person who is currently deemed to be 'in remission' from their 
abnormal state of mind may, while in that state, be brought for the first time 
within the arms of the definition. This gives rise to the possibility that those 
persons may be detained effectively on the basis of danger or diminished 
capacity for self-care. There is a safeguard against this, however. Even if the 
person is deemed to be mentally disordered by reason of an intermittent 
abnormal state of mind which is between 'episodes' at the time of the 
application for the compulsory treatment order, it must further be established 
that a compulsory treatment order is necessary in all the circumstances of the 
case.18 A judge is unlikely to be satisfied of this if no outward signs of 
mental illness exist. 
ii) Delusions/Specific Disorders 
The definition of mental disorder requires that the abnormal state of mind be 
characterised by delusions or by disorders of mood, cognition, volition or 
perception. These terms, like the others contained in the definition of mental 
disorder, are not based specifically on any psychiatric diagnostic criteria, for 
example, the DSM-III-R19 or ICD-10:20 "[T]his definition of mental 
disorder has created some confusion amongst psychiatrists, particularly because 
some of its language is not their usual language. "
21 
18 See below Part One, No 5. 
19 The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 3rd ed, 
Revised. 
20 World Health Organisation's International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision. 
21 Above n 15, p 202. 
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Some of the terms better correspond with medical terminology than others. 
For example, in R v T (a mental patient)v. ". . . an experienced and 
respected psychiatrist . . . was not very familiar with the term 'disorders of 
cognition', and did not know what the Act meant by a 'disorder of volition' .
11 
These terms, as legal creations, or, if based on medical usage, as parts of a 
legally created definition of mental disorder, will depend on cases coming 
before the courts for their interpretation. Where a medical meaning exists, 
courts are more likely to give weight to such a meaning but the final 
determination will always rest with the court: "Such a decision is not in the 
ultimate made by the psychiatrists who give the evidence but by the judge who 
in the particular case is required to weight it. 
1123 
The meaning of 'disorder of cognition' has arisen for consideration in the 
courts. In the T case, the Judge accepted the medical evidence that "[t]he way 
that psychiatrists view cognition is in the ability to think, remember, attend and 
have ability for abstract thought. Orientation also comes within the ambit of 
cognition and adaptiveness as measured by IQ ratings is a cognitive measure 
••• 
11 and held that mental retardation is a disorder of cognition. 
It has been suggested that it is particularly important to distinguish memory 
and orientation problems present in some elderly persons from true cognitive 
deficits which are attributable to organic disorder.
24 
Until further cases on the meaning of 'mental disorder' and hence its elements 
come before the courts, only speculation is possible regarding the meanings 
and boundaries of these terms. 
v. Above n 15, p 203. 
23 Gallen J in Re M [1992] 1 NZLR 29, 42. 
24 Above n 9, p 57. 
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'Delusions' are probably the least contentious of the terms. The meaning of 
delusion is generally accepted, in psychiatry at least, as false beliefs 
comprising three elements. These are:25 
(i) absolute conviction in the false beliefs by the person holding 
the beliefs; 
(ii) the beliefs must not be amenable to rational argument or 
objective evidence to the contrary; 
(iii) idiosyncracy, that is, other members of the individual's social, 
cultural or religious group do not share that belief. 
Delusional beliefs are often absurd, for example, persecution, or impossible, 
and the individual's occupation with them often excludes other mental 
activity.26 
It would seem that disorders of mood, volition or perception would not be 
difficult to establish if mood, volition and perception are given their ordinary 
dictionary meanings. 
What may save too many persons from being caught by the definition of 
'mental disorder' is not these terms but rather the resultant outcomes required 
from such conditions.Z7 The potential width attributable to them on their 
ordinary meanings may, however, increase the reach of 'mental disorder' wider 
than was intended. 28 
25 Above n 9, p 53. 
26 Above n 9, p 53. 
Z7 See below Part One, No 2B (iii), (iv) and (vi). 
28 See the comments on the possible use of 'disorder of volition' in Part One, No 4B. 
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(iii) 'Of Such A Degree' 
The abnormal state of mind must be of such a degree that it poses danger or 
seriously diminishes capacity for self-care. In other words, an abnormal state 
of mind and, for example, danger to others may co-exist but still not satisfy 
the definition of mental disorder. On the wording of the section, the danger 
or diminished capacity must actually result from the abnormal state of mind. 
The practical effect of the need for a link between an abnormal state of mind 
and the presence of danger may frequently be minimal. It will be rare, for 
example, that threatening behaviour or a demonstration of violent tendencies 
of some sort by a person found to have an abnormal state of mind 
characterised by delusions etc ... will be seen as a result of general criminal 
tendencies rather than that state of mind. 
The link may, however, be useful in a situation involving a person with a 
minor mental retardation29 who is threatening violence where the cause of the 
threats is clearly unrelated to that disability. The wording prevents their 
detention for no reason other than that they may commit an offence. The 
compulsory powers of the mental health regime were not intended nor 
designed to be put to such effect nor could such a use be justified. 
The need for the connection assumes a strong practical significance in relation 
to a seriously diminished capacity for self-care. The capacity of a person with 
an abnormal state of mind to take care of himself/herself may be diminished 
not by that state of mind, but clearly by some form of physical disability (for 
example, paralysis). 
29 See discussion on R v T (above n 15) in Part One, No 3 as to whether mental 
retardation can be mental disorder. 
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Establishing that the cause of the seriously diminished capacity for self-care 
is physical disability rather than an abnormal state of mind is less difficult than 
establishing that the cause of the danger, rather than the abnormal state of 
mind, is simply violent tendencies. This is because of the visibility of a cause 
like physical disability. 
The required link does not prevent the possibility that a mentally retarded 
person who, as a result, has a seriously diminished capacity for self-care may 
be caught by the definition of mental disorder if it is accepted that mental 
retardation may satisfy the definition. 30 
iv) Dangerousness 
The second limb of the definition of mental disorder may be satisfied if the 
person concerned poses a serious danger to his/her own health or safety or to 
that of others.31 This is the first express use of the word 'danger' in New 
Zealand as part of the criteria for compulsory status. Previous committal 
criteria did, however, contain an implicit concept of dangerousness, although 
not as part of the actual definition of mental disorder. To be committed under 
the 1969 Act, it had to be shown not only that the person concerned was 
mentally disordered,32 but also that detention was required either for his/her 
own good or in the public interest. It could be said to be 'in the public 
interest' that mentally disordered persons be committed and compulsorily 
treated in the sense that society has an interest in seeing its members in a state 
of the best possible health. A broad interpretation of this nature would, 
however, render the alternative previous committal criterion, that is, that 
committal be for the person's own good, superfluous. This is because 
committal 'in the public interest' in the abovementioned sense would also be 
30 Above n 29. 
31 Danger to property is, therefore, excluded. 
32 See 1969 definition of mental disorder in Part One, No 2A. 
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for the good of the person concerned. Moreover, the words 'in the public 
interest', although potentially broad, have been interpreted to mean requiring 
committal to prevent no less than serious physical violence. 
33 
In Re M, 34 the patient had been detained in hospital under a reception order 
for several years following threats to kill both himself and a woman with 
whom he was obsessed. He had also previously been convicted on a number 
of fairly minor charges. He was being detained on the basis that he was 
mentally disordered and that his detention was required in the public interest. 
Gallen J accepted that detention could only be justified in the interests of the 
public "on grounds which were serious enough to be categorised as predicting 
dangerousness or something at least comparable in seriousness."
35 Previous 
violent actions may be an indicator but potential dangerousness must be 
assessed from the person's present state of mind and " ... in particular the 
possession of a particular outlook which is thought likely to give rise to 
unacceptable behaviour. "36 That unacceptable behaviour must be " ... no less 
than serious physical violence. "37 The potential for behaviour which amounts 
to, for example, a nuisance or which is unacceptable to a particular 
governmental philosophy38 is not sufficient to constitute dangerousness. A 
danger to others or serious physical violence was, therefore, previously 
required to detain someone 'in the public interest'. 
33 Above n 23, p 38. 
34 Above n 23. 
35 Gallen Jin Re M [1990/91] 7 CRNZ 390, 400. (This is a different reported version 
of the case at above n 23.) 
36 Above n 35. 
37 Above n 35. 
38 Above n 23, p 39. Note also that a person is not mentally disordered by reason only 
of his/her political opinions, below Part One, No 3. 
15 
A 'dangerousness' criterion was widely applied in nineteenth century English 
mental health legislation39 and remains implicit in current British 
legislation.40 It is currently used in the context of committal criteria in many 
jurisdictions.41 
It has been suggested that the original connection between dangerousness and 
psychiatry ". . . can be traced through shared precarious living conditions of 
the mad and bad in nineteenth century Europe. "
42 The link is certainly a 
tenuous one which is exaggerated by sensationalist publicity when incidents 
do occur. The proportion of psychiatrically ill persons who are dangerous is 
greatly overestimated.43 (The Mason Report
44 stressed that the connection 
between mental illness and dangerousness is not a universally shared 
perception outside Western culture.) This fact in itself should not prevent its 
use as a criterion for committal, however, under a regime which is trying to 
limit the use of compulsory powers to those persons on whom their use is 
absolutely necessary. 
39 Soothill, Ket al "Compulsory Hospital Admissions: dangerous decisions?" (1990) 30 
Med Sci Law 17, 18. 
40 Section 3(2)(c) Mental Health Act 1983 (UK). 
41 For example, implicit in s20 Mental Health Act 1963 (Tasmania). 
42 Above n 39, p 17. 
43 For example, see Haines, Hilary and Barton, Richard Alternatives to Psychiatric 
Institutionalization (1984, Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand, Parnell, 
Auckland) p 28. 
44 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Procedures Used in Certain Psychiatric 
Hospitals in Relation to Admission, Discharge or Release on Leave of Certain Classes 
of Patients ("The Mason Report") (New Zealand, August 1988). 
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The propriety of the use of dangerousness as a justification for compulsory 
status is, though, highly contentious and the literature on the topic is 
extensive. 45 
In 1974, Diamond launched a strong attack on its use in this context.
46 His 
assertion was that there is no scientifically reliable method for predicting 
dangerous behaviour47 and he argued that psychiatrists over-predict 
dangerousness ". . . by a factor somewhere between 10 and 100 times the 
actual incidence of dangerous behaviour. "48 The reasons for this are obvious. 
An over-prediction of danger will be difficult to ascertain because there is no 
way to know whether the later absence of any dangerous behaviour is due to 
the compulsory status or whether it would not have occurred anyway. On the 
other hand, the results of a mistaken prediction of absence of danger will be 
obvious and may expose those responsible for the error to extreme criticism. 
Erring on the side of over-prediction, therefore, becomes attractive to those 
whose duty it is to form an opinion as to whether a person poses a danger. 
Diamond concluded that psychiatrists are not able ". . . to predict the 
occurrence of violent behaviour with sufficient reliability to justify the 
restriction of freedom of persons on the basis of the label of potential 
dangerousness. "49 
45 For example, Levy, A et al "The Dangerous Psychiatric Patient Part 1: Epidemiology, 
Etiology, Prediction" (1989) 8 Med Law 131; Mullen, P "Dangerousness and Mental 
Disorder" in Mental Health: A Case for Reform (Legal Research Foundation Inc, 5 
September 1986) p 123. 
46 B Diamond "The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness" (1974) 123 Univ of 
Pennsylvania Law Rev 439. 
47 Above n 46, p 451. 
48 Above n 46, p 447. 
49 Above n 46, p 451. 
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On an application for a compulsory treatment order in New Zealand, any final 
determination of dangerousness is made by a judge rather than a psychiatrist. 
The judge may, however, ask for a report on the patient's condition from any 
person he or she considers qualified to do so. 
50 
Although Diamond's discussion was confined to psychiatric predictions of 
dangerousness, the same arguments regarding the inability to predict could be 
made even more strongly in relation to others called upon to determine the 
dangerousness of a person suffering from an abnormal state of mind. This is 
because, if anytxx:iy, highly trained and qualified psychiatrists are in the best 
possible positions to make such judgments. Greig J in Re M51 stated that 
although the decision and the responsibility for a determination of mental 
disorder rests with the judge, " ... he cannot have the knowledge, training or 
experience to say whether a person is suffering from a psychiatric disorder or 
whether that substantially impairs his mental health. In those areas the judge 
must rely on those who have that knowledge and experience. "
52 
Diamond recommended that psychiatrists should be called upon to do no more 
than give their opinion as to whether dangerous behaviour is a consequence of, 
or related to, the existence of mental illness once appropriate legal authority 
has declared a person dangerous on the basis of demonstrated violent 
behaviour. This recommendation does not eliminate the concept of 
dangerousness as a precondition for compulsory status but merely shifts the 
burden for its determination elsewhere. It does not remove the problems 
inherent in its definition and prediction which Diamond highlighted. 
Demonstrated violent behaviour does not necessarily make future violent 
behaviour sufficiently likely to justify compulsory status. Conversely, the 
50 Section 21. 
51 Re M Unreported, 21 April 1986, High Court Wellington Registry M716/85. 
52 Above n 51, p 14. 
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undesirability of postponing action until violent behaviour has occurred is 
evident 
The fact that the dangerousness criterion is so widespread despite numerous 
and ongoing criticisms of its use, however, indicates that it is perhaps the best 
option available to limit those caught by compulsory powers. 
An assertion of dangerousness does not provide a satisfactory indication of the 
behaviour which constitutes it. As stated above,
53 Gallen J in Re M, in 
dealing with the phrase 'in the public interest', held that there must be a 
danger of no less than serious physical violence. The writer suggests that a 
more appropriate interpretation of the dangerousness requirement is a danger 
of no less than serious physical harm. Focusing on the result of behaviour 
rather than the behaviour itself means that, in addition to danger of actions 
involving serious physical violence, danger of actions which do not fit the 
description of violence in everyday usage but which result in physical harm, 
for example, poisoning, or the neglect of children, will be caught. There is 
certainly room for such an interpretation of dangerousness on the face of the 
words of the new definition. The Mason Report went even further and 
accepted that of dangerousness be equated with the propensity to cause serious 
physical injury or lasting psychological harm.54 
Requiring a danger of serious physical violence to justify the imposition of 
compulsory status55 is consistent, however, with the approach taken in section 
5 Criminal Justice Act 1985 which contains a presumption of imprisonment for 
53 At p 15. 
54 Above n 44, p 208. 
55 Unless, of course, a seriously diminished capacity for self-care is established, see 
below Part One, No 2B (vi). 
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only those offenders who use serious violence.56 Under that section, courts 
look at the actions themselves to determine whether serious violence has 
occurred. The outcome of the actions in terms of physical harm is irrelevant 
to the application of the section.57 
A different approach in relation to the mentally ill is arguably justified, 
however, on the following grounds. Although both the MH(CAT) Act 1992 
and section 5 Criminal Justice Act 1985 are concerned with imposing 
particular restrictions on the freedom of those who are a danger to society, the 
objectives of the two in this regard are different. The purpose of the inclusion 
of the dangerousness element in the definition of mental disorder is to enable 
(through compulsory treatment) the protection of others. The focus in relation 
to dangerousness should, therefore, be on the potential for harm. Although 
incarceration of offenders also protects the public, an important aim and raison 
d'etre of section 5 Criminal Justice Act 1985 is the deterrence of violent 
behaviour. This justifies the focus on the offender's actions. The rationale for 
the difference in focus lies in the existence of the capacity to reason in a non-
mentally disordered person and therefore the possible effectiveness of 
deterrence. Further, the actions of a mentally ill person which do not 
constitute an offence and which demonstrate no such potential for harm cannot 
easily be described as causing serious danger. 
(v) The Seriousness Element 
The inclusion of the word 'serious' seems, prima facie, to imply a difference 
between 'danger' and 'serious danger'. 
56 Or just violence when an offender has previously been convicted on at least 1 
occasion within the preceding 2 years of an offence punishable by 2 or more years in 
prison - s5(2) Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
57 R v Dunn Unreported, 9 May 1989 CA 113/89. 
20 
Such a distinction sits more comfortably with the word 'violence' than the 
word 'danger'. Although the boundary is not clear, there can clearly be 
actions which constitute serious violence and other actions which constitute 
violence only. The focus is on the magnitude of the violence. (This is to be 
distinguished from the fact of the existence of violence being a serious matter.) 
In terms of magnitude, it is more contrived, however, to label some actions as 
constituting a danger to the health and safety of a person and others as 
constituting a serious danger to his/her health and safety. 
The writer suggests that the intention of the legislature in including the word 
'serious' was simply to allow compulsory status to be imposed on people when 
a reasonable possibility of danger exists, that is, 'serious danger' should be 
read as meaning 'a serious chance of danger'. It is suggested, therefore, that 
it is not the magnitude but the likelihood of danger which is at issue. 
Magnitude is relevant when looking at what there must be a danger of, that is, 
'serious physical violence' as Gallen J stated, or 'serious physical harm' which 
the writer has advocated as more appropriate. This is consistent with the 
suggestion made in Re 0 58 that 'serious' in this context means imminent or 
demonstrable. 
(vi) Seriously Diminished Capacity for Self-Care 
The quantitative limb of the definition of mental disorder may also be satisfied 
if the abnormal state of mind of the person in respect of whom an application 
for a compulsory treatment order is made is of such a degree that it seriously 
diminishes the capacity of that person to ta1ce care of himself/herself. 
The use of the word 'diminishes' is interesting. It seems to imply a standard 
relative to the person's usual ability to care for himself/herself rather than 
58 Judge Boshier in Re O [1993] NZFLR 545, 546. 
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some sort of generally accepted standard of self-care. It is suggested that not 
too much can be read into this, however, and that the section equates to a 
particular and low, although undefined, level of self-care. 
Which aspects of life self-care refers to is not clear. Obviously, the ability to 
maintain the basic needs of life such as f cxxl, clothing and shelter5
9 (or 
presumably, at least recognise and attempt to fulfil these needs in times of 
financial hardship) constitute self-care in this context. 
Dawson60 argues that failing to take medication when it is needed may show 
a seriously diminished capacity for self-care. The problem with such an 
approach, however, is that the need for enforced medication and therefore 
compulsory status is only established once the definition of mentally 
disordered is satisfied61 - the need for these is not a requirement of the 
definition itself. There is a danger of circular reasoning in the suggestion that 
a person has a seriously diminished capacity for self-care and therefore 
requires compulsory status/treatment because the person needs to be forced to 
take his/her medication. 
Self-care must, however, be referring to something more than the basic 
necessities of life. Neglect of these would undoubtedly constitute a serious 
danger to the health or safety of the person concerned and hence would satisfy 
part (a) of the quantitative limb. Part (b) would, therefore, be rendered 
superfluous if it is not able to be interpreted more expansively. Although not 
the subject of argument because a serious danger to others was established, 
Judge McElrea in R v T'2 suggested that self-care encompassed the regular 
59 Judge Keane in Re C Unreported, 14/15 June 1993, District Court Porirua Registry. 
60 Above n 9, p 29. 
61 And that in all the circumstances of the case a compulsory treatment order is deemed 
necessary. 
62 Above n 15. See below Part One, No 3 for an examination of the case. 
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taking of insulin for T's diabetes. 
uncontentious. 
Such an interpretation appears 
There are dangers, however, in interpreting self-care too expansively. 
r 
Although only obita, Judge Boshier in Re 0
63 suggested that self-care may 
embrace the spiritual as well as the physical. It is the writer's view that 
acceptance of self-care as more than physical care would inject too great an 
element of subjectivity into the definition. 
An individual's ability to take care of himself /herself depends to a certain 
extent on his/her relationships with family and friends. Even if the capacity 
for self-care is not examined against a backdrop of the individual's available 
current support, such support may be taken into account in deciding whether 
to impose a compulsory treatment order.64 
Satisfaction of the definition of mental disorder depends on the individual's 
capacity to care of himself/herself. The focus is therefore on the individual's 
ability to do this rather than on any use of that ability or fulfilment of that 
care. The fact that an individual is neglecting his/her self-care may be 
evidence of a seriously diminished capacity to do this but it can be no more 
conclusive than this. 
3 Exclusions 
Section 4 provides that a person shall not be subject to the compulsory 
assessment and treatment procedures by reason only of 
63 Above n 58, p 547. 
64 See below Part One, No 5. 
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a) That person's political, religious, or cultural beliefs; or 
b) That person's sexual preferences; or 
c) That person's criminal or delinquent behaviour; or 
d) Substance abuse; or 
e) Intellectual handicap. 
That section excludes persons from liability to assessment and treatment under 
the Act by reason only of certain characteristics and preferences they may have 
which are unrelated to the presence of any mental illness. 
Section 4 is partially based on a provision in the Mental Health Act 1983 
(UK). That provision is slightly different from this one in that the UK 
exclusionary rules are contained in the section which defines mental disorder 
and therefore are "specifically linked"65 to their definition of mental disorder. 
Section 4 complies with the World Federation for Mental Health Declaration 
on Human Rights and Mental Health to which New Zealand is a co-signatory 
and which provides: 
'Whereas a diagnosis of mental illness by a mental health practitioner 
shall be in accordance with accepted medical, scientific and ethical 
standards and difficulty in adapting to moral. social or political or 
other values in itself shall not be considered a mental illness ... ' 
(emphasis added) 
Factor (a) also complies with section 13 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 ("NZBORA") which provides that: 
"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, 
and belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without 
interference." 
65 Above n 9, p 30. 
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The rationale behind the inclusion of Factors (c), (d) and (e) in section 4 is not 
difficult to identify. Separate and specific regimes exist which are concerned 
with each of these factors. Criminals may be dealt with through the criminal 
justice system, substance abusers under the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction 
Act 1966, and the intellectually handicapped, if at all, through the Protection 
of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 and the Disabled Persons 
Community Welfare Act 1975. 
The words 'by reason only of' require closer examination. It is unclear 
whether the section is intended to mean only that compulsory status may not 
be imposed on a person on the basis of any one of grounds (a) to (e) on its 
own or whether it is also intended to prevent the use of compulsory powers on 
persons on a combination of two or more of these grounds. The use of 'only' 
and 'or' seems prima facie to suggest the former. The latter interpretation 
seems, however, to be the more sensible one. The purpose of the section 
would be defeated if a combination of characteristics makes a person liable to 
compulsory status when those characteristics individually do not. 
Nevertheless, the writer does not believe that the section means that these 
attributes and preferences should be discounted completely.
66 The factors 
may undoubtedly be relevant in deciding whether parts of the definition of 
mental disorder are satisfied, for example, a particular type of sexual deviancy 
may aid in a determination of dangerousness. Even though it cannot be said 
that a person is mentally disordered purely by reason of their sexual deviancy, 
the person may demonstrate a tendency to act in some harmful way because 
of that deviancy. This may assist in establishing dangerousness. 
66 Note the contrary view in R v Mental Health Review Tribunal, exp Clatworthy [1985] 
3 All ER 699, 703 where Mann J commented that sexual deviancy is to be discounted 
under the equivalent provision in the UK Act. 
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As seen above,67 it may be argued that mental retardation is an abnormal 
state of mind characterised by a disorder of cognition. Section 4 does not 
prevent a mentally retarded (or 'intellectually handicapped') person being 
deemed mentally disordered if the other criteria for mental disorder are also 
met. It simply means that the existence of the mental retardation is not 
sufficient on its own. If a mentally retarded person is also found to be 
dangerous, then he/she is not deemed mentally disordered by reason only of 
his/her mental retardation and therefore such a determination would not appear 
to conflict with section 4. 
The danger in interpreting a mental retardation as an abnormal state of mind 
characterised by a disorder of cognition is that mentally retarded persons may 
often have seriously diminished capacities for self-care and therefore 
technically could be subject to compulsory treatment on that basis. This would 
be completely contrary to current policy and practice which regards the 
mentally retarded and the mentally disordered as two completely separate and 
unrelated groups. Although making no finding on such an interpretation, the 
court in R v T'8 was required to interpret the definition of mental disorder 
in the context of a disability hearing. T was charged with assault with intent 
to commit sexual violation. It was accepted that T was mentally retarded and 
not mentally ill. The question before the District Court was whether he was 
under disability and therefore should not stand trial but instead be detained in 
a psychiatric hospital as a special or ordinary patient. Under section 108 
subsection one of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, a person charged with an 
offence is under disability if, because of the extent to which that person is 
mentally disordered,69 he/she is unable to plead, understand the nature or 
purpose of the proceedings or communicate adequately with counsel for the 
67 Above Part One, No 2B (i) and (ii). 
68 Above n 15. 
69 'Mentally disordered' is given the same meaning as in the MH(CAT) Act 1992 by 
reason of s2 Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
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purposes of conducting a defence. The decision, therefore, turned on whether 
the definition of mental disorder included mental retardation or whether it is 
excluded by section 4 MH(CAT) Act 1992. 
Judge McElrea was of the view that a mentally retarded person is capable of 
being mentally disordered within the definition for several reasons. Firstly, he 
found that mental retardation is an abnormal state of mind characterised by a 
disorder of cognition.70 Dangerousness and a seriously diminished capacity 
for self-care were also accepted without argument. Secondly, he held that if 
the definition of mental disorder did not encompass mental retardation, then 
its express exclusion in section 4 would have been unnecessary 
11
• • • except 
perhaps for the avoidance of doubt. "71
 The writer suggests that the avoidance 
of doubt is a primary reason for the enactment of the section 4 exclusions. 
Their existence is acknowledgment that, although constituting an attempt to 
create a greater degree of precision, the definition of mental disorder remains 
open to interpretation by the courts. 
The logical corollary of suggesting that the inclusion of mental retardation in 
section 4 necessarily implies that it would otherwise be encompassed by the 
definition is the suggestion that, had political or religious beliefs not been 
included in section 4, they too would have fallen naturally within the definition 
of mental disorder. Mental retardation may be caught by the definition of 
mental disorder but not, with respect, for this second reason. 
Another reason given for the court's finding was that the definition of mental 
disorder 11 • • • is not in its own terms limited to 'mental illness' and the courts 
should be slow to imply such a restriction when the legislature appears to have 
deliberately cast the definition in wide terms"
72 (emphasis added). 
70 See above Part One, No 2B (i) and (ii). 
71 Above n 15, p 204. 
72 Above n 15, p 204. 
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It is correct that the term 'mental illness' is now removed from the definition. 
The rationale behind the omission was not, however, to allow a meaning wider 
than mental illness but rather to attempt to define mental disorder as something 
narrower than general mental illness and to remove the circularity of the 
previous definition.73 Prior to the passing of the MH(CAT) Act, the feature 
of the definition which was most strongly acclaimed by the legislature was its 
alleged precision.74 Irrespective of whether it will in fact prove to be more 
precise, the legislature did not, with respect, deliberately cast the definition in 
wide terms. 
A further reason for the Court's finding that mental retardation is able to fall 
within the definition is undeniably a valid one. Section 4 limits the procedures 
under the Act which can be invoked by reason only of intellectual handicap. 
A person cannot be the subject of an application for assessment or a 
compulsory treatment order by reason only of his/her intellectual handicap. 
What section 4 does not do is state that a person is not mentally disordered by 
reason only of intellectual handicap.75 This is an important distinction. If 
mental retardation can be read into the words 'abnormal state of mind . . . 
characterised by ... a ... disorder of cognition' and if one of the rquired 
resultant outcomes is established, section 4 does not prevent other parts of the 
Act being invoked. In other words, section 4 only prevents the compulsory 
assessment and treatment procedures in Parts One and Two of the Act being 
invoked in such circumstances. 
Clarifying areas which cannot alone constitute mental disorder is useful when 
viewed in the light of the scope for interpretation which still exists in the new 
73 See above Part One, No 2A. 
74 Above n 8, pp 6865, 6867, 6874. 
75 Contrary to that stated in A User's Guide to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, Mental Health Policy Section, Department of Health, Wellington, 1992 at p 3. 
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and narrowed definition of mental disorder but, as has been seen, even section 
4 may itself give rise to problems in interpretation. 
4 Personality Disorder 
An issue which arises for consideration under the definition of mental disorder 
is whether a person with a personality disorder or, more particularly, a 
psychopathic personality disorder falls within the definition, that is, whether 
such a person may be subjected to compulsory treatment under the Act.
76 
Before considering this, the meanings of these terms need to be canvassed. 
A Defining 'Personality Disorder" 
The concept 'personality' is not easy to define with any precision. It has been 
observed that personality " ... will include such things as mood state, attitudes, 
and opinions ... [ which] ... must be measured against how people comport 
themselves in their social environments."77 Ascribing a 'normal' personality 
to a person indicates: ". . . that various personality traits are present to a 
broadly normal extent, neither to gross excess nor extreme deficiency. 
Abnormal personality is, therefore, a variation upon an accepted, yet broadly, 
conceived, range of personality. "78 
If an individual's personality is far enough removed from the concept of 
'normality', he or she may be said to be labouring under a personality 
disorder. Personality disorder is thus a relative concept. Its diagnosis depends 
on a comparison with the ordinary person. It is distinguishable from most 
76 Assuming that a judge considers that in all the circumstances of the case a compulsory 
treatment order is necessary. 
77 H Prins Dangerous Behaviour, the Law and Mental Disorder (Tavistock Publications, 
London, 1986) p 141. 
78 Above n 77. 
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mental disorders (using the phrase broadly), for example, schizophrenia, in that 
opinion is far from unanimous that a personality disorder is a mental illness 
in the conventional, medical sense. 
The Mason Report79 suggested that two elements constitute the modem 
concept of personality disorder. These are: 
i) any abnormality of personality which causes problems either to the 
person concerned or to others, and 
ii) unacceptable, anti-social behaviour coupled with a notion of dislike for 
the person showing such behaviour and a rejection of them. 
In summary, Prins80 cites the following definition of personality disorders as 
". . . a group of more or less well defined anomalies or deviations of 
personality which are not the result of psychosis or any other illness. The 
differentiation of these personalities is to some extent arbitrary ... " 
B Antisocial Personality Disorder 
The psychopathic personality disorder, or anti-social personality disorder 
("ASPD") as it is more recently known, is the most extreme of the personality 
disorders. Key characteristics include pathological egocentricity and incapacity 
to love, lack of remorse or shame, fantastic and uninviting behaviour, and 
general poverty in major affective reactions. However, there is also commonly 
an absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking.
81 These 
characteristics are often combined with a superficial charm, rendering the 
psychopath difficult to identify as someone with an 'abnormal' personality. 
79 Above n 44, p 215. 
80 Above n 77, p 142, quoting from Glossary of Mental Disorders, General Register 
Office, 1968:14. 
81 Above n 77, p 155. 
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External indicators common to mental illness, such as delusions, are also often 
absent. 
The notion of psychopathy is ". . . much influenced by prevailing cultural 
notions of responsibility and what is regarded as 'decent' behaviour."
82 
Determinations as to personality disorder, therefore, include making moral 
judgments about an individual's behaviour and/or beliefs. 
Little consensus existed between mental health professionals as to whether 
persons with ASPD were mentally disordered under the definition in the 
Mental Health Act 1969 (NZ).
83 Dawson stated that the majority view, if 
there was one, was that they were not 'strictly' covered but did occasionally 
'need' to be, and in fact were detained on this basis.
84 Even if it was agreed 
that ASPD could not fall under paragraph (a) of the old definition as a mental 
illness, paragraph (c) ('mental subnormality') was so broad that as long as the 
person concerned had a low level of intelligence, he/she would have been able 
to fall within the definition of mental disorder under that Act. 
It has been suggested that the current New Zealand definition of mental 
disorder is wide enough to encompass personality disorders.
85 A personality 
disorder, it was proposed, could fall within the words 'disorders of ... 
volition.' Volition can be defined as 'the ability to choose or control a course 
of action' .u, 
82 Above n 77, p 144. 
83 Dawson, John "The Civil Committal Process" in Legal Research Foundation, Mental 
Health: A Case For Reform (Legal Research Foundation Inc 5 September 1986) p 49. 
84 Above n 83. 
85 Trapski's Family Law Volume III Mental Health - Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights (Brooker and Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992) p A-22. 
u, Above n 9, p 102. 
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The British Mental Health Act 1983 is unusual in that it expressly includes 
psychopathic disorder as a mental disorder which justifies compulsory 
admission for treatment when such treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent 
a deterioration in condition.87 Psychopathic disorder is in turn itself 
defined.88 The requirement of a likelihood of response to treatment prevents 
the inclusion of those persons who are 11 ••• merely difficult, unco-operative 
or unlikeable" .89 
In a report made prior to the enactment of the 1983 UK Act, the Butler 
Committee considered that dangerous anti-social psychopaths who had 
previously exhibited any mental, organic or identifiable psychological or 
physical defect should be dealt with through the criminal justice system rather 
than the mental health system. 90 This argument has also been made as part 
of strong criticism of a US statute, the Minnesota Psychopathic Personality 
Statute of 1939.91 That legislation allows indefinite confinement of a person 
with a psychopathic personality 11 • • • without any finding that the person 
suffers from an illness known to medical science" .
92 It has been under 
87 Section 3 Mental Health Act 1983 (UK). 
88 'Psychopathic disorder' is defined as 'a persistent disorder or disability of mind 
(whether or not including significant impairment of intelligence) which results in 
abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the person 
concerned' - s2. 
89 Above n 77, p 145. 
90 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (1978); (Cmnd 6244) 
("Butler Report") cited in above n 77, p 144. 
91 See Erlinder, C P "Minnesota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the 'Politically Ill'" 
(1993) 19 William Mitchell Law Rev 99. 
92 Above n 91, p 100. 'Psychopathic personality' is itself defined as 'the existence in 
any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, 
or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the 
consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render 
such person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters and 
thereby dangerous to other persons.' 
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scrutiny lately due to its recent successful use by prosecutors as a mechanism 
to transfer violent sex off enders nearing the ends of their sentences to 
psychiatric institutions. That statute is unusual in that it exists alongside the 
State's commitment statute but the issues its existence and current use raises 
are equally applicable to any decision to deal compulsorily with someone on 
the basis of a personality disorder. 
Although detaining and treating a person to prevent harm to others may be an 
attractive proposition, such an action must be seen in the light of the 
unreliability of predictions of danger and keeping in mind the fact that 
indefinite preventive detention is imposed even on off enders only in strict 
circumstances. Courts frequently impose finite sentences on offenders and 
prisons release offenders when it is quite clear that further offending is 
possible or even probable. The use of compulsory powers on psychopaths who 
have not committed offences cannot even be justified on the ground that an 
important rationale behind the use of compulsory powers is treatment. The 
Butler Report (UK) found that psychopaths are generally not treatable, at least 
in medical terms (that is, no specific clinical condition is present and aetiology 
is difficult to determine). 
If a person is subjected to compulsory status on the grounds that they have a 
disordered personality, psychopathic or otherwise, they " ... may never gain 
release by a determination that [they] have been 'cured"'
93 because their 
disorder is not 'medical'. 
As far as the New Zealand MH(CAT) Act 1992 at least is concerned, the 
provision of effective treatment is one of its underlying aims. This is 
exemplified in the right to treatment enacted for the first time in New Zealand 
93 Above n 91, p 100. 
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mental health law.94 Bringing persons into a compulsory treatment regime 
whom it is known are not treatable conflicts with this aim. 
Gostin argues that "[t]here is no clear, consistent and rational distinction 
between offenders who have been labelled psychopaths and sent by the courts 
to hospital, and habitual offenders who are sent to prison without any 
psychiatric label. "95 It is arguable, therefore, that detaining a person on the 
basis that they have a personality disorder and without any treatment benefits 
is arbitrary detention contrary to section 22 NZBORA.96 Where it is unclear 
whether detention is legal within the Act, that is, in this case whether 
personality disorder falls within the section 2 definition of mental disorder, 
section 6 of the NZBORA should apply. This requires that where two 
interpretations of a statutory provision are possible, preference should be given 
to a meaning that is consistent with the NZBORA. 
Interpreting New Zealand's definition of mental disorder to include 
psychopathic personality disorder carries greater dangers than its inclusion in 
the UK statute because that statute defines psychopathic disorder and, further, 
it contains an express treatability requirement. 
5 Compulsory Treatment Order Necessary in All the 
Circumstances of the Case 
Even if the presence of a mental disorder within the definition is established, 
a compulsory treatment order may not be imposed unless the judge concerned 
with the application considers that in all the circumstances of the case, such 
an order is necessary. This requirement has been described as the ". . . 
94 Section 66. 
95 Gostin, L A Practical Guide to Mental Health Law (MIND, London, 1983) p 3 
quoted in Legal Information Service/Mental Health Foundation Task Force on 
Revision of Mental Health Legislation Towards Mental Health Law Reform (December 
1983) p 161. 
96 See below Part Two, No 2. 
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ultimate protective screen against unjustified loss of liberty and other 
fundamental rights ... rn There is no statutory guidance provided and no 
statutory limits set as to what factors may be taken into account in determining 
an order's necessity. 
The most obvious situation where a compulsory treatment order will be held 
to be unnecessary and, the writer suggests, one of the primary motivations for 
the inclusion of this additional criterion, is where the mentally disordered 
person is willing to undertake treatment on a voluntary basis. This is 
consistent with the use of the Act's compulsory powers as a last resort only. 
In Trapski's Family Law ,98 it is suggested that a situation where an order may 
not be considered necessary " . .. may involve a patient who is medicated and 
indicates an intention to continue to take medication or, if their capacity to 
take care of themselves is diminished, somelxxiy agrees to assume 
responsibility for them. "99 
Although the criteria for compulsory status contain no express treatability 
requirement, the writer suggests that one of the circumstances which may 
render an order unnecessary is a lack of effective treatment. As the name 
indicates, treatment is an important rationale for the imposition of a 
compulsory treatment order and, it is suggested, the only legitimate 
justification for detaining a person who has not committed an offence. It 
seems difficult to find a compulsory treatment order necessary when treatment 
can have no positive effect. 
rn Butterworth 's Family Law Service Commentary (Butterworths, New Zealand, 1993) 
p 9080. 
98 Above n 85. 
99 Above n 85, p A-80. 
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6 Standard of Proof 
The decision to impose a compulsory treatment order requires that the court 
be satisfied that the person concerned suffers from a mental disorder and that 
a compulsory treatment order is necessary in all the circumstances of the case. 
An explanation of a requirement that a court be satisfied is contained in R v 
White (David) .100 It means simply that the court must make up its mind and 
indicates a state where the court comes to a judicial decision on the evidence. 
Satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Although such an 
explanation was made in the context of a section of the Criminal Justice Act 
1985, there is no logical reason for it to be attributed a different meaning in 
the context of the MH ( CAT) Act 1992. 
100 R v White (David) [1988] 1 NZLR 264. 
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PART TWO 
THE REMOVAL OF A 
COMPULSORY TREATMENT ORDER 
1 The Need For Review 
Unlike offenders, mentally disordered persons are deprived of basic human 
rights due purely to the particular nature of their illness rather than due to any 
moral culpability on their part. Also unlike offenders, one determination of the 
legality of their detention is insufficient. The period for which they are subject 
to compulsory treatment does not have a fixed upper limit as does a prison 
sentence,101 and the (sometimes rapidly) changing nature of mental illness 
means that appropriate use of the powers under the MH (CAT) Act 1992 can 
quickly become inappropriate. The fact that a compulsory treatment order 
expires after six months unless renewed and again after a further six 
months,'02 is some safeguard against this but two extensions only are 
required before an order achieves indefinite status. 
To ensure that adequate grounds exist for the use of the Act's compulsory 
powers and that the right not to be arbitrarily detained in section 22 NZBORA 
is not being breached, regular and effective review of a patient's compulsory 
status is vital. 
2 Section 22 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Section 22 NZBORA provides: "Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
. . . detained." 
101 With the exception of those off enders serving sentences of preventive detention. 
102 Section 33. 
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The New Zealand courts have so far given a wide interpretation to the concept 
of 'detention'. 
In Re S,1°3 the applicant, a committed patient under the 1969 Mental Health 
Act, was released from hospital on leave under section 66 of that Act. The 
case concerned the availability of a section 74 inquiry into a patient's 
circumstances by a High Court judge. The Area Health Board concerned 
argued that no such inquiry was possible because S, as a patient on leave, was 
not 'detained or kept' as was required before the powers conferred by the 
section could be employed by the judge. Barker J rejected that argument and 
held that detention did not necessarily connote physical restraint or 
confinement and could encompass situations where a person is subject to 
involuntary supervision and/or perceives a lack of control over his/her actions. 
Although the court was concerned with the concept of 'detention' in the 
context of section 74 Mental Health Act 1969 rather than its use in section 22 
NZBORA, one of the stated reasons for such an interpretation was the broad 
interpretation given by the Canadian courts to 'detention' in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms on which the NZBORA is based. The 
element of supervision has been held to override the need for physical 
constraint.104 
Further, in Herewini v Ministry of Transport,
105 in the context of a different 
section of the NZBORA,Hl6 detention was held to mean any form of 
coercion, whether the coercion be physical, psychological or legal. 
103 Temm Jin Re S Unreported, 20 April 1993, High Court Auckland Registry M559/93. 
'
04 R v Therens 18 DLR 655, 678. 
105 Herewini v Ministry of Transport [1990-92] 3 NZBORR 113. 
106 Section 23. 
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The writer suggests that, given the generous interpretations of 'detention' by 
the courts to date, a person subject to a compulsory treatment order is 
'detained' so as to be able to claim the protection of section 22 NZBORA 
whether he/she is being held as an inpatient in a psychiatric institution, is an 
inpatient on leave, or is subject to a community treatment order. 
107 
The meaning of 'arbitrarily' in section 22 NZBORA has also been at issue 
before the courts. Gallen J in Re M,108 held that 'arbitrary' in the context of 
personal freedom is normally interpreted in terms of whether or not the 
detention is justified by existing law. Detention is not arbitrary if the decision 
to detain or continue detention is made in observation of "principles which are 
imposed statutorily or which are accepted as being applicable within the 
system as a whole" .109 The fact that in following such principles different 
decision-makers may reach different results on the same facts does not render 
such decisions arbitrary. In summary, Gallen J concluded that something is 
arbitrary when it is not in accordance with the law or with the principles which 
the law regards as appropriate for a discretion to be operated within. 
3 The Standard for Discharge 
As will be seen below, the outcome of many of the forms of review under the 
MH(CAT) Act 1992 depends on whether the patient is or is not considered to 
be fit to be released from compulsory status. The availability of discharge, 
therefore, depends on a patient under a compulsory treatment order
110 
meeting this standard. If a patient is considered fit to be released from 
compulsory status, then the compulsory treatment order is deemed to have 
107 See below Part Three for discussion of community treatment orders. 
108 Above n 23. 
109 Above n 23, p 41. 
110 This paper is not concerned with the review of the status of special or restricted 
patients to whom different sections apply. 
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expired. The person is then no longer subject to the Act and must be 
discharged. 
The meaning of the phrase 'fit to be released from compulsory status' is, 
therefore, pivotal. It is defined in section 2 of the Act as: 
• no longer mentally disordered and 
• fit to be released from the requirement of assessment or treatment 
under this Act. 
Admittedly, in most cases where a patient is deemed to be no longer mentally 
disordered, they will also be considered to be fit to be released from the 
requirement of assessment or treatment under the Act. It is, however, possible 
that there will exist patients who are no longer mentally disordered within that 
definition and yet continue to be subject to compulsory status on the basis that 
they are deemed not fit to be released from the requirement of treatment under 
the Act (that is, on the basis of the second limb of the definition of 'fit to be 
released from compulsory status').
111 These are persons who would not be 
placed under compulsory treatment orders if they were entering the system 
because they are not mentally disordered within the definition. A person who 
is considered a danger, but not a serious danger, to his/her own health is a 
possible example, so too is a person who no longer has the requisite abnormal 
state of mind but who has become 'institutionalised' due to long term 
detention. 
m It is unclear whether the standard for discharge under the 1969 Act allow continued 
detention of a person who was no longer mentally disordered. Greig J in Re M above 
n 51 and Judge Unwin in Report to the Minister under a s 73 Inquiry Unreported, 22 
November 1984 held that it was not implicit under the Mental Health Act 1969 that 
absence of mental disorder will determine the decision as to discharge. On the other 
hand, Ellis J in In re M (a mental patient) Unreported 17 April 1986, High Court 
Auckland Registry M1419/85 held that the discharge provisions did not authorise the 
detention of a person who was not mentally disordered. 
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Continued detention justified on the second limb may seem to be arbitrary and 
therefore a breach of the NZBORA. However, as stated above, 
112 Gallen J 
in Re M held that detention is not arbitrary when it is justified by law. 
The existence of both limbs would perhaps be more easily understandable if 
'dangerousness' was not a component part of the definition of mental disorder 
but rather a second and separate criterion to be satisfied before compulsory 
status could be imposed. The possibility of danger could then be looked at 
under the second limb. The legitimacy of continued detention, even on the 
basis of potential dangerousness, would be questionable, however, if the person 
concerned is no longer mentally disordered. It would result in a sentence 
equivalent to preventive detention being imposed on a person who may not 
have committed any offences. 
There is the possibility that this second limb was included to account for those 
persons whose mental illness is 'in remission' but who have a history of short 
periods of remission while undergoing compulsory treatment and who, 
therefore, continue to require compulsory status. However, as discussed 
above, 113 the definition of mental disorder provides that the abnormal state 
of mind may be continuous or intennittent and therefore those persons who are 
not displaying obvious signs of mental illness may still fall within the 
definition of mental disorder. The possibility of 'remission' does not, 
therefore, provide a justification for the existence of the second limb. 
The limb may also have been included to account for those persons who are 
no longer mentally disordered because of the ongoing compulsory treatment 
but who it is predicted will become mentally disordered again within the 
definition if released from compulsory status and fail to continue treatment on 
a voluntary basis. The fact that an intermittent abnormal state of mind suffices 
112 Above Part Two, No 2. 
113 Above Part One, No 2B (i). 
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for the definition of mental disorder is not necessarily enough here. For 
example, a person may have a continuous abnormal state of mind but no 
longer pose a serious danger to health or safety or is able to take care of 
himself/herself adequately due to ongoing compulsory treatment. 
It is suggested that detaining persons who are no longer mentally disordered 
is unacceptable notwithstanding the above possible justification. The dangers 
inherent in such widely-worded powers outweigh the benefits which may exist 
for a few patients who may require release from compulsory status only to 
have a compulsory treatment order re-imposed shortly afterwards. 
The writer suggests two changes to the current standard for discharge. 'Fit to 
be released from the requirement of assessment or treatment under the Act' 
can only mean that a compulsory treatment order is not necessary in all the 
circumstances of the case. For the sake of clarity and consistency with the 
standard for the imposition of a compulsory treatment order,
114 therefore, it 
would be preferable to amend this second limb to 'a compulsory treatment 
order is no longer necessary in all the circumstances of the case'. Secondly, 
the word 'and' between limbs one and two should be replaced by the word 
'or'. Both limbs must be satisfied before imposition and therefore, if either 
limb ceases to be satisfied, the person should be entitled to be released from 
compulsory status. 
4 Clinical Review 
Every person who is subject to a compulsory treatment order must have their 
condition formally reviewed by their responsible clinician (RC) no later than 
3 months after the date of the order (this is recognition of the potentially rapid 
114 Section 76(1). 
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stabilising effects of psychotropic drugs), and subsequently at intervals of not 
greater than 6 months.
115 
Such a review involves the RC examining the patient and consulting with other 
health professionals involved in the care and treatment of the patient. The RC 
must take the views of the other health professionals into account when 
assessing the results of his or her review of the patient's condition.
116 
Findings must be recorded in a certificate of clinical review in the prescribed 
form,117 which must state whether or not, in the opinion of the RC, the 
patient is fit to be released from compulsory status. 
118 
If the RC is of the opinion that the patient is fit to be released from 
compulsory status, the patient must be released from that status, at which time 
the compulsory treatment order is deemed to have been revoked.
119 If, 
however, the RC is of the opinion that the patient is not fit to be released from 
compulsory status, he or she must send a copy of the certificate to certain 
listed persons and bodies
120 and, in addition, to some of them 
121 a 
statement of the legal consequences of the finding and of the recipient's right 
to apply to the Mental Health Review Tribunal ("MHRT") for a further 
review.122 
115 Section 76(1). 
116 Section 76(2). 
117 See Appendix B for forms. 
118 Section 76(3). 
119 Section 76(5). 
120 Section 76(7). 
121 Section 76(8). 
122 Above n 117. 
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Irrespective of the opinion of the RC, he or she must also send to the Directo
r 
of Area Mental Health Services the certificate plus full particulars of th
e 
reasons for the opinion and any relevant reports from other health professiona
ls 
involved in the case.
123 
No provision for mandatory automatic clinical review of psychiatric patient
s 
has previously existed in New Zealand. 
5 Tribunal Review 
A Mental Health Review Tribunals 
The Act provides for the establishment of MHRTs.
124 There are to be such 
number of MHRTs as the Minister of Health appoints from time to time.
125 
Although new entities in New Zealand, MHRTs are well established in othe
r 
jurisdictions. They have been in operation in the United Kingdom since 1959
, 
and at present exist in Canada and in most states of Australia. 
126 Their 
principal function
127 is the review of a patient's condition with a view to the 
revocation of the compulsory treatment order. They do, however, perform 
a 
number of secondary functions, for example, the investigation of complaint
s 
that the rights of a patient have been denied or breached. 
128 
123 Section 76(4). 
124 Section 101. 
125 Above n 123. 
126 Bell, Sylvia (ed) Legal and Consumer Issues in Mental Health Law - Volume 
One of 
the Edited Proceedings of the Mental Health Foundation's Conference '87
 (1988, 
Mental Health Foundation of New Zealand, Parnell, Auckland), 16; Legal Info
rmation 
Service/Mental Health Foundation Task Force on Revision of Mental
 Health 
Legislation Towards Mental Health Law Reform (Dec 1983), 316. 
127 Stated as such in s102. 
128 Section 75. 
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B Constitution 
MHRTs consist of 3 persons appointed by the Minister of Health, one of 
whom must be a barrister or solicitor, and another a psychiatrist.
129 Unlike 
the UK tribunals, there is no statutory requirement in New Zealand that the 
third tribunal member be a layperson.
130 Deputies are able to be appointed 
by the Minister to replace members who are absent due to illness or other 
reasons.131 
In contrast to clinical review, the MHRT as a decision-maker is independent 
from the detaining authority. Moreover, it is heralded to be superior to a fully 
judicial body in that it enjoys both legal and medical internal expertise and 
constitutes an attempt to strike a balance between 'medicalism' (the idea that 
psychiatry needs freedom from legal regulation to function effectively) and 
'legalism' (the idea that psychiatry, unregulated, has too great a potential for 
abuse).132 The presence of the lay member provides a further layer of 
knowledge and experience. "The legal, social and medical approach is . . . 
interwoven in the decision-making process. 
11133 
A MHRT is empowered by statute (or required if requested) to co-opt other 
persons as members for the purposes of the particular hearing when no 
129 Section 101. 
130 They always are in practice, however - Interview with Catherine Coates, Mental
 
Health Policy Section, Department of Health, August 1993. 
131 Section 105. 
132 Note, though, that research has indicated the domination of the medical perspective
 
in MHRTs - Peay, Jill "Mental Health Review Tribunals and the Mental Health
 
(Amendment) Act" (1982] Crim L R, 794, 803. 
133 Bridge, C and Bridge, G W K "Civil commitment: a multi-disciplinary analysis" 
(1984) 14 VUWLR 145, 153. 
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member of the MHRT is of the same ethnicity or gender as the patient.
134 
MHRTs are also able to co-opt any person who may be of assistance to them 
due to the person's specialised knowledge or expertise.
135 These provisions 
exemplify the multi-disciplinary approach which currently prevails in relation 
to the care and treatment of mentally disordered persons.
136 
C The Hearing 
Patients may or may not be represented at MHRT hearings. Under section 70 
of the Act, the patient is entitled to request a lawyer. The utility of such an 
entitlement depends, however, on its actual exercise by the patient. Even if 
patients do request and receive legal representation, the effectiveness of 
ordinary lawyers in such a specialised situation may be limited. In this 
context, a patient advocacy service specifically for psychiatric patients is 
desirable. No provision was made for such a service in the Act due to the 
proposed introduction of a Health Commissioner. 
A MHRT review of a person subject to a compulsory treatment order may 
arise in the following ways:
137 
a) Of its own motion at any time (including after referral from a district 
inspector).138 
b) Of its own motion after receiving a copy of the cert~icate of clinical 
review. In these cases, the MHRT must at least consider whether it 
should review the patient's condition. 
134 Section 103(1). 
135 Above n 134. 
136 For example, the patient's RC need not be a psychiatrist - see s2. 
137 Section 79. 
138 Section 76(11). 
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c) On application from any person to whom a copy of the certificate of 
clinical review is sent. 
d) On application from any person to whom a copy of the certificate of 
clinical review should have been sent (when the RC has failed to 
conduct such a review). 
In the last two cases, the MHRT must conduct the review within 14 days of 
receipt of the application with two exceptions. The MHRT may refuse to 
consider an application for review of the patient's condition: 
• if it has considered an application for review within the preceding 3 
months and the certificate of clinical review states that the patient's 
condition is unchanged; or 
• when the application is made by a relative or friend
139 and the 
MHRT is satisfied that the application is made otherwise than in the 
best interests of the patient. 
If the section is to be workable, the words 'if it has considered an application 
for review within the preceding 3 months' must be read to mean 'if it has 
conducted a review of the patient's condition or considered whether it should 
review the patient's condition within the preceding three months'. This is 
because a MHRT cannot merely have 'considered an application for review' 
when it is mandatory to review an application. At some point, the MHRT 
would have had to have been able to merely consider an application for the 
first exception to ta1ce effect The Department of Health publication "A User's 
Guide to the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992", 140 although not acknowledging any difficulty with the actual words 
of the statute, interprets 'if it has considered an application for review within 
139 Who would, presumably, come under the category of principal caregiver which is 
itself defined in s2. 
140 Above n 75. 
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the preceding 3 months' to mean 'if it has considered the patient's condition 
within the preceding 3 months' .
141 
The MHRT, by reason of section 82, must follow the procedure set out in the 
First Schedule to the Act when reviewing a patient's condition. 
142 
D After-Care Facilities 
Before a judge can order that a person be subject to a community treatment 
order,143 he or she must be satisfied that adequate facilities exist for the 
patient's care and treatment in the community.
144 There is, however, no 
statutory requirement that the MHRT consider after-care facilities when 
deciding on a patient's discharge. Further, a MHRT is not able to attach any 
conditions to the discharge of a patient. 
The justification for the difference in requirements in the two situations lies in 
the fact that in the first case, the patient is ill to a point where compulsory 
status is still considered necessary, whereas in the latter, a decision is made to 
discharge because the patient no longer meets the criteria for compulsory 
status. Taking into account the availability of appropriate subsequent support 
facilities would shift the focus away from the person's condition. 
The Government, however, has recently issued guidelines for clinicians to 
follow when a patient is discharged. The guidelines " ... emphasise that each 
patient must have an identified key worker ... where followup treatment and 
141 Above n 75, p 47. 
142 See Appendix D for First Schedule. 
143 Above n 107. 
144 Section 28(4)(a). 
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care is needed. Each hospital or similar service that treats people with mental 
disorders is expected to put in place its own discharge planning protocol." 
145 
E Automatic Tribunal Review 
After the operation of MHRTs for several decades in the UK, automatic 
MHRT review was introduced for those patients who did not apply for review 
or on whose behalf an application for review was not made.
146 Until then, 
patients eligible for review tended not to exercise that right. Automatic review 
was also recommended in New Zealand before the intrcxiuction of the current 
Act 147 At present, if no application is made by the patient or on the 
patient's behalf. the undertaking of any MHRT review is left to the discretion 
of the MHRT. As long as the MHRT at least considers whether to review, 
they may never actually review a patient's status. 
The existence of District Inspectors is helpful 
148 but even if they refer the 
patient's case to the MHRT, the MHRT's decision to review remains 
discretionary. 
Automatic review can be said to be superior to any other form of review 
because its occurrence does not depend on the initiative being taken by those 
whose initiative may be impaired.
149 
145 Katherine O'Regan, Associate Minister of Health quoted in The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 16 August 1993. 
146 Above n 132, p 796. 
147 Legal Information Service/Mental Health Foundation Task Force on Revision of 
Mental Health Legislation Towards Mental Health Law Reform (December 1983) p 
161. 
148 See below Part Two, No 6 for an outline of their role. 
149 No automatic review exists in relation to personal or property orders made by the 
court under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988. Under that Act, 
the decision to impose the order has been made by the court. The situation is 
different from that under the MH(CAT) Act 1992 in that although the initial decision 
to impose a compulsory treatment order is made by the court, the decision to continue 
it is made by a non-independent purely medical decision-maker. 
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If automatic MHRT review is not considered acceptable, the writer suggests 
that there should be ongoing renewal of the compulsory treatment order and 
that the order not be made indefinite, as it currently is, after two extensions. 
This may even be preferable to automatic review in that the burden for the 
continuation of the order falls on the party seeking to continue it. 
150 
Once a MHRT review is concluded, the MHRT must complete a certificate of 
tribunal review in the prescribed form, 151 stating its opinion as to whether the 
patient is fit to be released from compulsory status. A copy of the certificate 
must be sent to those persons to whom a copy of the certificate of clinical 
review was sent. In addition, a copy must be sent to the Director of Mental 
Health and to the RC. The same persons to whom a statement of the legal 
consequences of the clinical review had to be sent must, under section 79 
subsection 11, be sent the same in relation to the MHRT review. They must 
also receive notification of their right to appeal to the court against the 
MHRT's decision. 
F Reasons 
At no stage is a MHRT required by statute to provide reasons for its decision. 
Section 27 subsection 1 of the NZBORA provides: 
"Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has the 
power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights, 
obligations or interests protected or recognised by law." 
150 The disadvantage of this is that such applications for extension are heard before the 
courts rather than before the MHRT and, therefore, the benefits of the MHRT are lost. 
151 Above n 117. 
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The writer suggests that natural justice requires that reasons be given for a 
statutory decision to continue a patient's compulsory status. 
In the UK, reasons must be recorded in writing in all cases in a prescribed 
form and delivered within 7 days. 152 
The Task Force153 recommended that reasons be required for a decision of 
a MHRT. Factors in favour of its recommendation included the following: 
a) The applicant and/or patient can see that justice is being done; and 
b) A requirement of reasoned decisions forces MHRT members to 
verbalise their thinking in a rigorous and disciplined manner. 
Greenland154 also suggested that reasons be given to provide guidance to 
patients as to their future behaviour. 
The ability of any MHRT reasons to achieve these results depends on the 
willingness of the MHRT to do more than merely restate the legislation. For 
example, a statement that discharge is refused because the patient remains 
mentally disordered or because the patient is not considered fit to be released 
from the requirement of compulsory treatment would be inadequate. Adequate 
reasons assume real importance in the light of the scope for interpretation 
which still exists in the current definition of mental disorder. 
Mere restatement of the legislation has occurred, on occasion, in the UK. 
152 Mental Health Review Tribunal Rules, Rule 23 (UK). 
153 Above n 147. 
154 Greenland, C Mental Illness and Civil Liberty: A Study of Mental Health Review 
Tribunals in England and Wales, Occasional Papers on Social Administration No 38 
(Willner Brothers Ltd, Birkenhead, England, 1970), p 115. 
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Donaldson M R in Alexander Machinery Ltd v Crabtree
155 held that the 
overriding test must always be whether the tribunal has provided both parties 
with the materials which will enable them to know that the tribunal has made 
no error of law in reaching its finding of fact. 
Reasons should also be supplied to the patient after a clinical review. This 
would require very little effort because the RC is already required to send 
reasons for his/her decision to the Director of Area Mental Health Services 
with the certificate of clinical review. 
The provision of reasons for a decision is also necessary to enable effective 
judicial review of that decision. 
6 The Role of the District Inspector 
The role of the district inspector, continued under the new Act with a few 
modifications, is the position under the Act most closely resembling a patient 
advocate for mentally disordered persons. District inspectors have been 
described as 11 • • • watchdog[s] for the rights of persons who have already 
become subject to the provisions of the Act or who appear likely to become 
subject to such provisions. "156 
As a result of the introduction of MHRTs, the functions of district inspectors 
have been expanded to include involvement on the patient's behalf in the 
review process. More specifically, under section 76 subsections 9 to 12, the 
district inspector who receives the copy of the certificate of clinical review 
must talk to the patient, ascertain his or her wishes in the matter and then 
consider whether an application should be made to the MHRT. If it is 
considered necessary, the district inspector must take whatever reasonable steps 
155 Alexander Machinery Ltd v Crabtree [1974] ICR 120. 
156 Above n 12, p 30. 
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he or she thinks necessary to encourage or assist the patient or the patient's 
welfare guardian, principal caregiver or usual medical practitioner to make 
such an application. If neither the patient nor these other persons intend to 
make such an application and the district inspector considers that one should 
be made, he or she may report the matter to the MHRT. The MHRT may then 
review the patient's condition of its own motion. Note that the ultimate 
decision to review still lies with the MHRT. 
The district inspector is empowered to arrange for the Official Visitor to 
instead perform these functions. 
These provisions which apply to 'clinical review to MHRT stage' also exist, 
with appropriate modifications, in relation to the 'MHRT to Court' stage.
157 
7 Appeal to the Court 
Certain persons158 who receive a copy of the certificate of MHRT review 
stating that the patient is not fit to be released from compulsory status may 
appeal to the court against the decision of the MHRT within one month of that 
decision.159 (There is no provision for the detaining authority to appeal 
against a decision of the MHRT that a person is fit to be released.) 
The court must then review the patient's condition. This involves the judge 
examining the patient as soon as practicable,160 consulting with the RC, at 
least one other health professional involved in the case and any other person 
157 Section 79(12) to (15). 
158 The patient, the patient's welfare guardian, principal caregiver and usual medical 
practitioner. 
159 Section 83. 
160 See s16(2) as to the form of the examination. 
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the judge thinks fit. If the judge considers the patient is fit to be released from 
compulsory status, he or she must order accordingly. 
There is a statutory presumption in favour of the review being conducted by 
a Family Court judge but, where not practicable, it may be conducted by a 
District Court judge.161 
Although termed an 'appeal', it is really an inquiry into the patient's condition 
at the time of the proceedings rather than an appeal against or review of the 
MHRT's decision.162 
8 Judicial Inquiry 
Under section 84, any person may apply to a High Court judge to inquire into 
the circumstances of a person who is being detained as a patient in a hospital. 
Standing under this section is not, therefore, limited to those persons entitled 
to apply for a review before the MHRT or the court. An inquiry may also be 
made of the High Court judge's own motion. 
The predecessor to section 84163 in the Mental Health Act 1969 (now 
repealed) was the sole means under the previous regime by which a committed 
patient could gain a review of his or her position by an authority wholly 
independent of the hospital or the government. 
164 
The purpose of such a section is " ... to provide additional protection and an 
additional safeguard to those who may be detained ... in a mental hospital. 
161 Section 83(2) in conjunction with s16(6) and (7). 
162 In Re C (a mental patient) [1959] NZLR 529. 
163 Section 74 Mental Health Act 1969. 
164 Above n 147, p 313. 
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It is an important supervisory function of the Court and is a statutory 
expression of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to maintain a 
protective and supervisory function over those who are under a disability."
165 
The previous equivalent section applied to persons 'detained or kept as 
mentally disordered in any hospital, house or other place' .
166 This was held 
to include persons on leave in their own homes.
167 This generous 
interpretation was proffered because the court recognised that the objective of 
section 74 was to enable a High Court judge to review the condition and status 
of a person subject to compulsory powers under the Act at any time. 
Therefore, the previous section applied to every person who was subject to the 
Act. 
The possibility of a judicial inquiry under the current section clearly exists 
only for those patients 'detained in a hospital'. The arguments as to the 
interpretation of the concept of detention that were made in relation to section 
22 NZBORA cannot be made in relation to section 84. This is because the 
possibility of a wide interpretation is removed by the use of the words 'in a 
hospital'. 
It clearly does not exist, on the face of section 84, for those patients subject 
to community treatment orders. It would also seem to now exclude those 
patients on leave from a psychiatric institution. Unlike the previous section, 
it does not extend to all persons restricted by the Act's compulsory powers. 
Given the ability to interpret any compulsory status as effective detention, it 
is unfortunate that the new judicial inquiry section deprives a large number of 
compulsory patients of its protection. 
165 Above n 51, p 15. Affirmed in Re S, above n 103. 
166 Above n 163. 
167 Barker Jin Re S [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 239, 249. 
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If the judge is satisfied after an examination of the patient (by a district 
inspector or any other person(s) the judge may select) and on the evidence of 
medical or other witnesses that: 
a) the person is detained illegally in the hospital as a patient; or 
b) the person is fit to be discharged from the hospital, 
the judge must order that the person be discharged from the hospital 
immediately.168 
The phrase 'fit to be discharged from the hospital' in paragraph (b) does not 
correspond with the wording of the general standard for discharge in the Act 
which is 'fit to be released from compulsory status'. The former phrase 
arguably requires a lower standard than the latter. 
169 
A person could continue to be mentally disordered within that definition
170 
and therefore not be 'fit to be released from compulsory status' but could be 
considered by a judge to be fit to be discharged from hospital. This anomaly 
would be overcome if the writer's suggested amendments to the definition of 
'fit to be released from compulsory status' were made. 
Another potential problem with the section is the possibility that a judge may 
be satisfied that the person concerned is fit to be discharged from hospital but 
requires treatment in the community and is not therefore fit to be released from 
compulsory status altogether. The section does not, however, make provision 
for the conversion of an inpatient order to a community treatment order and 
seems to allow only outright discharge, that is, release from the provisions of 
the Act. 
168 Note that under s84(8) the judge is also able to report to the Minister of Health with 
comments and recommendations. 
169 See definition of 'fit to be released from compulsory status' in above Part Two, No 
3. 
170 See s2. 
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'Fit to be discharged' was the general standard for discharge in the 1969 
Act171 and it is possible that this is merely an inadvertent and unfortunate 
carrying over of that terminology. It has been suggested that 'fit to be 
discharged from the hospital' should be read as 'fit to be released from 
compulsory status' .172 'This suggestion assumes that 'discharge from the 
hospital' means outright discharge. 
9 Habeas Corpus ('You Have the Body') 
A writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative writ directed to a person who detains 
another commanding them to present the person before the court to test the 
legality of the detention. 173 
Section 23 NZBORA states that: 
"(1) Everyone who is ... detained under any enactment 
(c) shall have the right to have the validity of the ... 
detention determined without delay by way of habeas 
corpus and to be released if the ... detention is not 
lawful." 
Further, section 84 subsection 9 of the MH(CAT) Act 1992 expressly leaves 
open the possibility of " ... any other remedy or proceeding available by or 
on behalf of any person who is or is alleged to be unlawfully detained, 
confined or imprisoned." The possibility of habeas corpus proceedings is, 
therefore, not ruled out. 
171 Section 73 Mental Health Act 1969. 
172 Above n 85, p A-165. 
173 The Australian Legal Dictionary (Hargreave Publishing Coy, 1980) p 104. 
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Are these proceedings available to a person subject to compulsory powers 
under a community treatment order? 
On their face, the above provisions appear to limit the availability of habeas 
corpus to those patients who are subject to an inpatient order, that is, those 
who are actually held in a psychiatric institution. Admittedly, section 28 
NZBORA provides that existing rights are not abrogated or restricted merely 
because they are not included or are only included in part in the NZBORA. 
Section 84 subsection 9 MH(CAT) Act 1992 could, however, be argued as 
impliedly limiting the avenues for review to those contained in the Act itself 
for those persons who are subject to compulsory status but who are not 
'detained'. 
The broad interpretations of 'detention' being made by the courts have already 
been discussed.174 The suggestion has been made that detention in relation 
to mentally disordered persons encompasses a broader concept than that 
normally contemplated by judges.175 One judge has written that detention 
in this context means " ... that the person is made subject to the will of other 
persons in respect of where he lives and how he lives and about whether and, 
if so, by what means his condition will be treated."
176 
If this is accepted, detention would clearly apply to those persons subject to 
community treatment orders. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the use of both 'confined' and 'detained' 
in section 84 subsection 9 implies that each word connotes a different standard 
and that one is actually something less than physical restraint. 
174 See above Part Two, No 2. 
175 Above n 12, p 27. 
176 Above n 12, p 27. 
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Further, a distinction could be drawn between this subsection and subsection 
1 of section 84 which specifically states 'detained in a hospital'. 
There do not appear to be any reported New Zealand cases in which a 
psychiatric patient has challenged his or her detention by way of habeas 
corpus. This is probably due to the availability of a section 84 action ('judicial 
inquiry')_ m 
10 Judicial Review 
Judicial review is not expressly provided for in the Act. The 'appeal' to the 
court, the MHRT hearing, and the judicial inquiry under section 84 are not 
reviews of the earlier decisions. 178 
However, section 27 subsection 2 NZBORA provides: 
"Every person whose rights, obligations or interests protected or 
recognised by law have been affected by a determination of any 
tribunal or other public authority has the right to apply, in accordance 
with law, for judicial review of that determination." 
179 
Any person may apply for the judicial review of the exercise or refused 
exercise of a statutory power of decision affecting their rights
180 on the 
grounds of unlawfulness, unfairness, irrationality or arbitrariness. 
181 In the 
context of the MH(CAT) Act 1992, this may relate to such an exercise by any 
177 Above n 147, p 314. 
178 Above n 9, p 70. 
179 Section 27(2) affirms the right to judicial review provided in s4 Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972. 
180 Section 4 Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
181 Above n 9, p 70. 
59 
of the persons or bodies who conduct a review of the patient's condition, for 
example, the interpretation of the definition of mental disorder by the MHRT. 
It has been suggested that courts may be reluctant to interfere with difficult 
decisions in this area, particularly those with considerable clinical content.
182 
11 The High Court's Inherent Jurisdiction -
11 A Somewhat 
Murky Stream 11183 
Under section 17 of the Judicature Act 1980 the High Court of New Zealand 
has 
". . . all the jurisdiction and control over the persons and estates of 
mentally disordered persons as the Lord Chancellor of England or any 
Judge or Judges of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice or of Her 
Majesty's Court of Appeal, so far as the same may be applicable to 
the circumstances of New Zealand, has or have in England under the 
Sign-Manual of Her Majesty or otherwise." (emphasis added) 
There are no longer any English judges with jurisdiction assigned to them by 
Warrant under the Sign-Manual.184 
The House of Lords held in In re F (Mental Patient: SterilisationJ1
85 that the 
courts' inherent or parens patriae jurisdiction over mentally disordered adults 
was totally extinguished upon revocation of the Warrant in 1960 (it was 
182 McCarthy Pin Re R [1974] 1 NZLR 399, 406. 
183 Above n 182. 
184 Turner Jin Re P (A Mental Patient) [1961] NZLR 1028, 1030. 
185 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 (HC). 
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replaced by comprehensive mental health legislation) and that it is the role of 
the legislature rather than the courts to breathe life into it again. 
The fact that section 17 is in the present tense would indicate that that 
jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts was also extinguished. The New 
Zealand courts do, however, appear in the main to accept the continued 
existence of a wide parens patriae jurisdiction over mentally disordered 
adults. 186 This is despite the express statutory powers given to the High 
Court in section 84 MH(CAT) Act 1992 - the court's jurisdiction is not 
exhausted by wide powers given in a corresponding statute. 187 Its existence 
is not, therefore, dependent on section 84 subsection 9 of the Act. 
In Re S188 in the context of an application under section 84 of the MH(CAT) 
1992 Act, Temm J in the High Court commented that the obligation imposed 
on a High Court judge by section 17 Judicature Act 1980 and ". . . to some 
extent, spelled out by the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992, is a very solemn responsibility, not lightly to be set to 
one side." 189 
Any exercise of the court's inherent powers is governed by the principle of the 
best interests of the person for whose benefit the powers exist. 
190 
186 Above n 182, p 401. 
187 Above n 184, p 1031. 
188 Above n 103. 
189 Above n 103, p 4. 
190 W Atkin "The Courts, Family Control and Disability - Aspects of New Zealand's 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988" (1988) 18 VUWLR 345, 362. 
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The only dissent from this acceptance of the continuation of the High Court's 
inherent jurisdiction can be found in Re H. 191 Judge Inglis QC held that " . 
. . there must be doubt whether, in New Zealand, the parens patriae jurisdiction 
remains available in the case of an intellectually disabled adult ... "
192 The 
writer suggests that these comments, made in the Family Court, may indicate 
that the matter has not yet been settled authoritatively but do not override the 
High Court's earlier statements regarding the jurisdiction. 
Given the limitation on the use of section 84 and the possibility that the right 
to habeas corpus in section 23 NZBORA may be construed narrowly, any 
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court may be a useful avenue for protection 
for those patients who are subject to compulsory status and who fall outside 
the scope of these other safeguards. 
191 Re H [1993] NZFLR 225. 
192 Above n 191, p 229. 
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PART THREE 
COMMUNITY TREATMENT ORDERS 
1 Introduction 
Under the new Act, a compulsory treatment order may take the form of an 
inpatient order in which case the mentally disordered person is confined and 
treated in a psychiatric institution. Alternatively, it may take the form of a 
community treatment order ( CTO) in which case the mentally disordered 
person is treated while living in the community. 
This is the first time in New Zealand that a legal framework has been 
established which provides for alternatives to institutional care and treatment 
for those persons who need to be cared for and treated involuntarily. Courts 
have never before been equipped to order that a mentally disordered person be 
compulsorily treated outside the traditional confines of a psychiatric hospital 
and in his or her home or community. 
The creation of the community treatment order is a result of an international 
trend in the last few decades away from the mental health ideology and 
practice which centred on the psychiatric hospital as the normal method to deal 
with those suffering from mental disorders. This process, commonly known 
as 'deinstitutionalisation', has coincided with increased attention being given 
to community mental health services as an alternative method. Community-
based care and treatment have had an expanding role in New Zealand mental 
health practice for some time. They are, however, new concepts in New 
Zealand mental health law. 
Before the community treatment orders themselves are discussed, the 
deinstitutionalisation process and the accompanying move towards community 
mental health services for mentally disordered persons will be examined to put 
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community treatment orders in their context and to outline the philosophical 
underpinnings of their provision. 
2 Deinstitutionalisation 
A The "Sociological Phenomenon" 193 
The asylum as the normal way to deal with mentally disordered persons was 
the result of a nineteenth century movement by "humane men of 
conscience"194 who believed they had found a solution to the problem of how 
to care for and cure the mentally disordered. It is at least claimed that it was 
originally thought to be in the patient's best interests to be secluded in that it 
ensured their protection from the harshness of the outside world. 
Psychiatric institutions began to spring up in New Zealand soon after 
colonisation.195 Numbers of psychiatric patients peaked here in 1944 when 
0.5% of the population was resident in a psychiatric hospital. Since the middle 
of this century, however, the deinstitutionalisation which has been occurring 
in many countries has also been underway in New Zealand. The proportion 
of the population detained in psychiatric institutions has been declining 
steadily.196 Psychiatric institutions have either undergone significant 
reductions in inpatient numbers or have closed down completely. This process 
193 A phrase used in Robinson, David (ed) Mental Health Care in the Community 
Seminar Report 10 September 1986 (Wellington Community Mental Health Services 
Group, Wellington, 1986) p 16. 
194 Murphy, Elaine "Community mental health services: a vision for the future" (1991) 
302 British Medical Journal 1064, 1064. 
195 The first psychiatric institution opened in Karori in 1854. Haines, Hilary and Abbott, 
Max "Deinstitutionalisation and Social Policy in New Zealand: 1: Historical Trends" 
(1985) 1 Community Mental Health in New Zealand 44, 45. 
196 Above n 195, p 54. 
64 
is continuing. It was recently announced that Tokanui Psychiatric Hospital in 
the Waikato will be closed in June 1995. 
A dramatic shift in mental health ideology has taken place. The emphasis is 
no longer on the confinement and seclusion of mentally disordered persons but 
rather on their care and treatment in the community. Mentally disordered 
persons who would previously have been institutionalised for considerable 
pericxis of time are now spending much, if not all, of this time in the 
community. 
There is no typical community mental health service. They range from 
assistance in the mentally disordered person's own home to drop-in centres to 
supervised accommodation. 
Standard hospitalisation of mentally disordered persons in New Zealand has 
been described as ". . . an era gone, an obsolete way of providing mental 
health services" .197 
B Reasons for Change 
The introduction and development of modern psychoactive drugs in the 1950s 
played a large role in moving patients out of institutions and back into the 
community.198 The powerful behaviour-modifying effects of these drugs 
meant that, in many cases, long periods of hospitalisation were no longer 
necessary. These drugs were accompanied by new therapy techniques, for 
example, occupational therapy, which purported to provide patients with the 
skills necessary to survive in the community. 
197 See Appendix C for diagram from above n 191. 
198 Tony Cull, Chief Executive, Waikato Crown Health Enterprise, quoted on Radio 
Pacific, Auckland, April 1993. 
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Deinstitutionalisation was propelled also by a growing recognition amongst 
mental health professionals of the detrimental effects of long-term 
hospitalisation.199 It was increasingly accepted that institutionalisation was 
self-perpetuating. An institution by its nature removes a person's responsibility 
for his or her daily life. This conflicts with one of the expressed aims of 
therapy which is to enable patients to manage independently.200 
"The movement towards community psychiatry grew out of the 
realization that chances of discharge from mental hospitals are 
diminished by long-term residence, and that this occurs regardless of 
age or clinical condition . . . . The depressed surroundings, the 
enforced idleness, the loss of ordinary privileges, and the isolation 
from family, friends and developments in the outside world, all of 
which may be attendant features of institutional life, often result in 
loss of motivation, withdrawal, apathy, submissiveness and an 
inability to make decisions. Ultimately, the patient may conform to 
institutional life, which precludes his participation in the 
community. 11201 
Proponents of deinstitutionalisation argue that not only are these negative 
effects of institutionalisation diminished by community-based services but so 
too is the stigma which accompanies the inpatient or ex-inpatient label. 
Evidence that care and treatment in the community could be as, if not more, 
effective than hospitalisation for many patients also had an effect.202 It came 
199 Above n 195, p 47. 
200 Haines, Hilary and Abbott, Max (eds) The Future of Mental Health Services in New 
Zealand: Deinstitutionalisation, Volume 1 of the Edited Proceedings of Mental Health 
Foundation of New Zealand's 1985 Conference (1986, Mental Health Foundation of 
New Zealand, Parnell, Auckland) p 23. 
201 Gostin, LA Human Condition Volume One (MIND, London, 1975) p 13 quoted in 
above n 147, p 109. 
202 Above n 200, p (vi). 
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to be accepted that, to achieve its maximum potential, care and treatment had 
to be tailored to the individual. Hospitalisation, by its very nature, standardises 
the way in which patients are dealt with and, when compared to community 
treatment, is highly inflexible. 
It has been suggested that the community is the traditional place for support 
in difficult times and therefore the appropriate place for the provision of 
mental health services.203 Patients are more accessible and thus the 
community, and not only mental health professionals, are able to be involved 
in ensuring a patient's well-being. 
This accords with the current multi-disciplinary approach to mental health care. 
(The problem with such a suggestion is that the 'community' in the sense of 
a supportive, geographically linked entity rarely exists today. Modern society 
has witnessed a fragmentation of the community and family support systems. 
Those most in need of mental health care are likely to be those who are least 
able to form support networks.) 
There is little doubt that the strongest politically motivated force behind 
deinstitutionalisation was a desire to reduce State health expenditure. The cost 
of running psychiatric institutions is extremely high - in 1990 it was 
approximately $100,000 per inpatient per year.204 Such costs are difficult to 
justify in light of a more attractive alternative and the negative effects of 
institutionalisation on patients. 
In theory, at least, deinstitutionalisation and a move to community mental 
health services sounds like a good idea. The reality of deinstitutionalisation, 
as indicated by overseas experience,205 is less positive. This experience has 
203 Above n 193, p 14. 
204 John Dawson "Community Treatment Orders" (1991) 7 Otago Law Review 410, 412. 
205 For example, the USA, above n 193, p 15. 
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shown that the process has simply allowed the State to transfer responsibility 
for the mentally disordered to voluntary agencies or patients' families who 
may or may not be financially, emotionally or physically equipped to cope. 
This has had detrimental effects on both the mentally disordered and the 
communities into which they have been released. Of these effects, the most 
apparent are: 
• mentally disordered persons being left homeless 
• rest homes being used to cope with the mentally disordered 
• mentally disordered persons being diverted into the criminal justice 
system206 
• increased burden on women as the principal caregivers. 
Although the extent of these effects in New Zealand is uncertain, there are 
indications that they are at least beginning to occur.207 
C Reasons for the Problems 
There are a number of reasons for these problems. The most obvious of these 
is the severe shortage of funding available for mental health services. 
Adequate care and treatment in the community may not be as expensive as 
hospitalisation but it is certainly not inexpensive.208 
206 Above n 193, p 15. 
207 For example, three psychiatrically disturbed convicted inmates in Auckland's Mount 
Eden prison attempted self-mutilation in one evening - The Dominion, Wellington, 
New Zealand, 20 April 1993, p 1. This was blamed on a lack of community mental 
health services. 
208 Above n 200, p (vi). 
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Some funding for community mental health services is available through the 
Departments of Health, Social Welfare, Housing, Labour, and Justice?)9 
Apart from private donations, any other funding of such services is at present 
a matter left to the discretion of individual Regional Health Authorities.210 
There is no requirement that any proportion of their expenditure be tagged for 
community mental health services or even for mental health services in 
general. Money saved by the now obsolete Area Health Boards211 in 
deinstitutionalisation does not have to follow patients into the community and 
generally does not.212 This is illustrated by the drop in the proportion of the 
Auckland health budget given to mental health services in the last 5 years from 
14% to 8%.213 In this era of cuts to the State health budget, mental patients 
as the 'silent sufferers' are one of the groups most in danger of being pushed 
to the back of the queue. 
It is not surprising that ad hoe, inadequate funding in this area has resulted in 
ad hoe, inadequate services. The issue has received a great deal of media 
attention recently and widespread dissatisfaction has been voiced over the state 
of these services.214 It is consistently agreed that community mental health 
services in New Zealand are far from satisfactory.215 
209 National Mental Health Consortium The Tangata Whenua Report, The Consumer 
Report, The Consortium Report (Department of Health, Social Welfare, June 1989) p 
56. 
210 Interview with Catherine Coates, Mental Health Policy Section, Department of Health, 
May 1993. 
211 Abolished under s22 of the Health Reforms (Transitional Provisions) Act 1993. 
212 Above n 200, p 14. 
213 Quoted on Holmes show, Television New Zealand, Channel One, 11 May 1993. 
214 For example, the Public Service Association's hospital subgroup of psychiatric nurses 
have called for a Royal Commission on community mental health services in New 
Zealand. 
215 For example, above n 200, p (vi). 
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The success of the changing trend depends on the social setting in which the 
change occurs as well as on economic factors. Public attitudes towards the 
mentally disordered remain predominantly negative despite the change in 
practice. As stated above,216 the number of mentally disordered persons who 
are potentially dangerous is frequently over-estimated. 'This fear can create a 
barrier to effective community mental health services. 
The fact that mentally disordered persons do not fit a common mould and 
therefore have diverse needs also causes difficulties. If all patients are to 
benefit from the potential flexibility of community mental health services, a 
comprehensive system comprising many different levels of service is essential. 
Some of the negative effects of deinstitutionalisation may be relieved if an 
effective nationwide monitoring system is put into place. The Disabled 
Persons Community Welfare Act 1975 provides for nationwide monitoring but 
only in relation to 'homes' intended to accommodate or provide for five or 
more disabled persons.217 These must be registered with the Department of 
Social Welfare. At present, Regional Health Authorities have responsibility 
for monitoring the standards of mental health services in their regions. 218 
Although proper monitoring would not ensure that sufficient community 
mental health services are available, it would help to ensure and maintain an 
appropriate standard amongst those that are available (conditional, of course, 
on appropriate sanctions being applied to those who fall below the standards 
required). 
216 Part One, No 2. 
217 The definitions of both 'home' and 'disabled person' are contained in the Disabled 
Persons Community Welfare Act 1975 (as amended by the Health Reforms 
(Transitional Provisions) Act 1993). 
218 Above n 145. 
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3 Pre-Law Practice 
As mental health ideology changed in other countries, so too did the law.219 
Reforms in Italy provide an extreme illustration of these changes.220 In 1978 
and 1979, the Italian Government closed its psychiatric hospitals to new 
admissions and required the steady discharge of existing inpatients. It directed 
local authorities to establish general community health centres which were to 
include mental health services and obliged general hospitals to provide small 
numbers of emergency psychiatric beds. Committals were to be for an 
absolute maximum of 30 days. These reforms were based on the belief that 
it is the responsibility of the community as a whole to look after the mentally 
ill. 
In New Zealand, the change in ideology and then practice went unaccompanied 
by any relevant law reform. How, then, was it possible for community mental 
health practice to develop in the absence of any legal framework for its 
provision? 
Section 66 of the now repealed Mental Health Act 1969 provided the Directors 
of Mental Health Services and Superintendents of psychiatric institutions with 
powers to grant (and revoke) leaves of absence to committed patients.221 
Leave could be granted for an initial pericxi of up to two years and extended 
from year to year at the discretion of the Director or the Superintendent with 
219 For example, the Community Mental Health Act 1963 (US). 
220 See J Schaverien "Italian Mental Health Services: A Personal View" (1984) 1 
Community Mental Health in New Zealand 31. 
221 There was also provision in s38 Mental Health Act 1969 for a district court judge to 
order the detention of a mentally disordered person as a single patient in a house 
rather than a hospital but this was rarely, if ever, used - Dawson, John "The 
Development of Community Mental Health Services in New Zealand: Implications for 
Law Reform" (1984) 1 Community Mental Health in New Zealand 12, 15. 
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the approval of the Director. Alternatively, patients were rehospitalised for 
one night upon the expiry of the initial leave period and subsequently released 
for a further period of up to two years.222 
The original purpose of this section was to permit a small number of 
committed patients to be granted limited periods of leave with a view to their 
eventual discharge.223 The section was positive in that it facilitated rapid 
readmission when required and allowed the taking of medication to be 
enforced outside the hospital setting. 
It was the 1969 Act's inadequacy in the light of the changing mental health 
ideology that resulted in this artificial and extensive use of section 66. The 
section was forced to become the mechanism by which community care and 
treatment was facilitated. At one point in the mid 1980s, patients on leave 
outnumbered those detained in psychiatric hospitals.224 
The artificiality of this use of section 66 was not, however, its only criticism. 
There was a clear lack of procedural protection for patients on leave under 
section 66.225 Leave could be granted on any conditions the Director or 
Superintendent deemed fit and could be revoked at any time without a formal 
hearing, reference to statutory criteria or reasons being supplied to the patient 
concerned. It has been suggested that this lack of protection provided potential 
for breaches of natural justice, for example, the right of detained persons to be 
advised of the evidence against them. 226 
222 Above n 221, p 16. 
223 Above n 221, p 16. 
224 Above n 204, p 415. 
225 Above n 204, p 415. 
226 Above n 221, p 16. 
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4 Community Treatment Orders - Description 
There is a presumption in the Act that a compulsory treatment order shall be 
a community treatment order unless the court considers that the patient cannot 
be treated adequately as an outpatient.227 No indication of what is meant by 
this qualification is provided. 
In addition, section 28 states that, before ordering a community treatment 
order, the court must first be satisfied that care and treatment will be provided 
that is appropriate to the needs of the patient and that the social circumstances 
of the patient are adequate for his or her care within the community.228 As 
with the requirement that the patient be able to be treated adequately on an 
outpatient basis, there is no indication as to what is meant by 'social 
circumstances'. It is the writer's view that both phrases are sufficiently broad 
so as not to require the presence of the other. 
The CTO will specify the place of treatment and the institution or service 
which is to carry out that treatment. 229 The place of treatment may be the 
patient's home or some other specified place.230 Employees of the institution 
or service stated in the order who are authorised to provide treatment to the 
patient are entitled to have access to the place of treatment at all reasonable 
times.231 
If at any time while the CTO is in force the RC considers that the patient can 
no longer be treated adequately as an outpatient, the patient may again be 
227 Section 28(2). The writer suggests that s126 Health Act 1956 is inconsistent with the 
new regime, unnecessary and ought to be repealed. 
228 Section 28(4)(b). 
229 Section 29. 
230 Above n 229. 
231 Section 29(2). 
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required to undergo the assessment procedure and an inpatient order may be 
made by the court. 
CTOs have an initial lifespan of six months.232 This may be extended for 
a further six months upon application to the court. 233 If a further application 
is made and a second extension ordered, the CTO will remain in force 
indefinitely.234 The RC may direct at any time that the patient be released 
from compulsory status at which time the CTO will expire.235 
5 Community Treatment Orders - Objections 
It has been suggested that rather than providing an alternative to inpatient care, 
CTOs may allow an expansion of the class of persons able to be subjected to 
compulsory care and treatment?36 No data on the effect of CTOs is 
available at this stage. The power given to the courts to order CTOs is 
certainly not, however, intended to allow a widening of this net. As discussed 
above,237 before a CTO may be considered, the court must be satisfied that 
the criteria contained in the definition of 'mentally disordered' are met and, 
further, that in all the circumstances of the case a compulsory treatment order 
is necessary. 
As stated above, before ordering a CTO under section 28 the court must be 
satisfied that appropriate outpatient care and treatment is available to the 
patient. The section states that this care and treatment must be provided by the 
232 Section 33. 
233 Section 34(2). 
234 Section 34(4). 
235 Section 35(1). 
236 Above n 204, p 412. 
237 See above Part One. 
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relevant Area Health Board.238 At first sight, this appears to provide some 
measure of protection against the State relieving itself of responsibility for 
those mentally disordered persons requiring compulsory care and treatment in 
the community. It would seem, however, that the requirement that the Boards 
provide the service is being interpreted very loosely. Until the creation of 
Regional Health Authorities and the abolition of Area Health Boards,239 
Boards arranged with community mental health agencies in the particular area 
to provide the service. (This role will now be undertaken by Regional Health 
Authorities or by a person declared to be a purchaser for the purposes of 
section 20 Health and Disability Services Act 1993.) There is no limitation on 
who the community mental health agencies are into whose care the mentally 
disordered person may be sent Further, the 1992 Act imposes no statutory 
obligation on Boards to fund those agencies and formal acceptance by the 
agency is not a pre-condition of a CTO. 
Even if section 28 is a sufficient safeguard against inadequate community care 
and treatment for those subject to CTOs under that section, that safeguard does 
not extend to all mentally disordered persons under CTOs. There are 2 other 
possible ways (other than an application under section 28) in which a CTO 
may originate or may have already originated. These are: 
a) Under section 30 subsection 2 of the 1992 Act, the RC may, during an 
inpatient order, direct that the patient be discharged and treated as an 
outpatient. The inpatient order will then be deemed to have effect as 
a CTO. 
238 Section 28(4)(a). This section was not included in the amendments to the MH(CAT) 
Act 1992 made by the Health Reforms (Transitional Provisions) Act 1993. Therefore, 
the discussion of the section will employ the old terminology. 
239 Above n 211. 
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b) Any patient who was on leave under section 66 Mental Health Act 
1969 for more than 3 months when the new Act came into force was 
deemed to be subject to a CT0.240 
There is no statutory requirement that adequate outpatient services be available 
for mentally disordered persons who become subject to CTOs by means of 
either of these 2 methods. 
A fundamental objection raised in relation to community treatment orders is 
that they are unenforceable, that those mentally disordered persons for whom 
compulsory care and treatment is deemed necessary will not attend a specified 
place and/or accept treatment. This may well be true (although the absence of 
data at this early stage of the new regime means that, so far, only speculation 
is possible). The success of community treatment orders is dependent on the 
premise that a mentally disordered person under an order in the community, 
and under the implicit threat of being admitted or re-admitted to a psychiatric 
institution, will be more likely to decide that the community treatment order 
should be complied with.241 
6 Leave Provisions 
The leave provisions have been re-enacted alongside the CTOs. These are 
unchanged except that the leave period is now limited to a maximum of six 
continuous months.242 These were retained to cater for those patients who 
are capable of and will benefit from spending periods of time in the 
240 Section 144 MH ( CAT) Act 1992. 
241 James, Dr Basil "The New Mental Health Act" in above n 126, p 15. 
242 Section 61. 
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community but who are in need of a higher level of care than the community 
is able to provide.243 
Patients on leave under the new system are as deprived of procedural 
protection as were those under the old. The Parliamentary Select Committee 
recommended that reasons be supplied to the patient being recalled but that 
recommendation was not implemented in the legislation. 
There is nothing preventing the new leave provisions being manipulated in the 
same manner as the old. Institutions are still technically able to re-admit 
patients for one night. The only difference is that that will now have to be 
after a period of six months rather than two years. The presumption in favour 
of a community treatment order for a person entering the system for the first 
time will, however, prevent the leave provisions being used in this way as 
frequently as previously. 
243 Above n 210. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act vastly improves New Zealand's mental health laws. The 
current definition of mental disorder represents a serious attempt to define 
more precisely those persons on whom the Act's powers are intended to be 
used. 
The new and extensive review procedures and, in particular, the establishment 
of the entity called the Mental Health Review Tribunal, are also to be 
welcomed. Admittedly, the efficacy of many of these avenues for review 
currently depends on their accessibility to individual patients. Any inherent 
merit they may have is detracted from if the persons for whose protection they 
are devised are not able to take full advantage of them. This is, however, a 
problem which may best be resolved by an effective psychiatric patient 
advocacy service and is not a result of defects within the review provisions 
themselves. 
Community treatment orders are positive innovations which have given legal 
foundation to what was rapidly becoming mental health practice and which 
ensure the least possible restrictions on a mentally disordered person's rights. 
If they are to achieve their full potential, adequate funding is imperative. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the new regime, real difficulties which have 
been indicated throughout the paper exist within the confines of the Act itself. 
These may or may not be resolved by the courts but at present they jeopardise 
fulfilment of the least restrictive alternative doctrine. 
Compatible with the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative is the shift in 
focus which the Act embodies from the confinement of mentally disordered 
persons to their treatment. In this context, the absence of an express 
requirement that persons be treatable before a compulsory treatment order may 
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be imposed is notable. Arguably, such a requirement is implicit throughout the 
Act The Act sets down a right to treatment which seems to assume that a 
patient is treatable. A community treatment order cannot be imposed unless 
the patient can be treated adequately in the community. The courts may 
interpret the requirement that a compulsory treatment be necessary in all the 
circumstances of the case to mean that effective treatment is possible. 
Nevertheless the writer suggests that satisfaction of an express treatability 
requirement before imposition of a compulsory treatment order is preferable. 
A finding that it is no longer satisfied would require the removal of the order. 
A requirement of this nature would resolve a number of the uncertainties 
which currently exist such as the positions of the personality disordered and 
the mentally retarded. 
The use of a compulsory treatment regime cannot be justified without some 
benefit to the mentally disordered person and some prospect of a change in 
status. Through the innovations canvassed, the Act attempts to limit as much 
as possible the breaches of the rights which inevitably occur under such a 
regime. A treatability requirement would go some distance to compensating 
for the residual loss of rights. 
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COMPULSORY ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 
- KEY POINTS -
Pf it I I 
( ft-o""" DepaA~ 0 { f 
APPLICATION FOR 
ASSESSMENT 
Section 8 
Asseument Examination 
Section 9 
Certificate of 
Preliminary Assessment 
Section I 0 
Fint Period of Assessment 
and Treatment (5 days) 
Section 11 
Certificate of 
Further Assessment 
Section 12 
Second Period of Assessment 
and Treatment ( 14 Days) 
Section 13 
Certificate of 
Final Assessment 
Section 14 
APPLICATION TO COURT 
FOR COMPULSORY 
TREATMENT ORDER 
Final Period of Assessment 
and Treatment pending Hearing 
of CTO Application ( 14 Days) 
Section 15 
DECISION POINT: 
Is proposed patient considered 
to be mentally disordered? 
DECISION POINT: 
ls further assessment and 
treatment desirable? 
DECISION POINT: 
Is patient fit to be released 
from compulsory status? 
\,{~~ \h A l,k..e..,, 's CuiJ· 
+o ~ vvt l-1 (c A,) Ad- 1 
NO FURTHER 
ACTION 
RELEASE FROM 
COMPULSORY 
STATUS 
NOTE 
(C\4'.L) • 
At any point during compulsory 
assessment application may be 
made to the Court for review 
of the patient's condition. 
COMPULSORY ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 
- PROCEDURES -
·:ll!nl examination is arranged 
W!HI or duly authorised 
)Jrlngements to ,_nclude: . 
,anon of a qualified me_d1c~I 
ruooner to conduct examination; 
. lilltnaiion of the time and place 
•e mmination; 
:1~~ transportation and escort 
1~ proposed patient. 
:;oied pa1ient is notified in 
~ ihe requirement to attend at 
d place and time for 
i,on. The notice must include 
inauon of the purposes of the 
uon and the name of the 
1onduc1ing the examination. 
uimination must be conducted 
1 p1ih1atrist or, if unavailable, 
11:ilified medical pracririoner 
1 man the certifying practitioner) 
md by the DAHHS. 
11ining medical practitioner 
frepare a certificate of preliminary 
eni Hating that the statutory 
·: of mental disorder has 
1on1ide red and that the patient 
I i not mentally disordered. 
The doctor giving the 
accompanying medical 
certificate must have seen 
the proposed patient within 
three days of the application 
being made. 
At any stage during the 
application and asmsment 
process, advice and assistance 
is available from duly 
authorised officm appointed 
by the Area Health Board. 
The DAHHS must ensure that the 
purposes of the examinarion and 
the requirements of the notice 
are explained to rhe proposed 
patient in the presence of a 
member of the proposed 
parient's family, or caregiver or 
other person concerned with the 
patient's welfare. 
Where rhe proposed patient is not 
considered mentally disordered, the 
certificate must be sent to DAHHS 
together with reasons for that finding, 
and any relevant reports. The 
patient must be released from 
compulsory status. 
die proposed patient is considered 
ent. lly disordered, copies of the 
te are sent, with a statement of 
!:niequences and notice of the 
' apply to the Court for a review 
fatient's condition to· 
iarie n~ ' · 
wtlfare guardian of the patient; 
~phcan~ 
lrincip~I care giver, and 
iauent s usual doctor. 
-. 
DAHHS must ensure that a responsible 
clinician is assigned to the patient. 
• Examining practitioner must determine 
whether treatment can be given on an 
inpatienr or outpatient basis and must 
notify the patient accordingly. 
• 
During the fim assessment period 
the responsible clinician may direct 
that the patient be admitted or 
released from hospital as required. 
The patient is to be notified in 
writing of any change in the place 
or conditions of treatment. 
• Before the expiry of the first period 
the responsible clinician prepares a 
certificate of further assessment, 
stating whether the patienr is. or is 
not, menially disordered. The grounds 
for that finding must also be stated. 
+ 
Where the patient is not 
considered mentally disordered, the 
certificate is sent to the DAHHS, 
together with reasons for that 
diagnosis and any relevant reports. 
The patient must be immediately 
released from compulsory status. ,, 
Where the patient is considered to be in 
need of further assessment and 
treatment, copies of the certificate must 
be sent, with a statement of legal 
consequences, to: . the patient; . any welfare guardian; . the applicant; . the principal care giver; . the patient's usual doctor; . a district inspector; . an official visitor. 
' The responsible clinician notifies the proposed patient in writing of the 
requirement to undergo further 
assessment and treatment for a period 
of 14 days starting from the date on 
which the norice is received. The place 
of rreatment must be specified in the 
notice and a copy senr to rhe DAHHS. 
• 
The district inspector must ascertain the 
parient's views and consider if 
applicarion should be made to the 
Court for review of the parient's 
condition. --. 
Before rhe expiry of rhe second period 
of assmmenr and rrearment rhe 
responsible clinician must prepare a 
certificate of final assessment w11h a 
copy and parriculars for rhe DAHHS. 
• 
Where the patient is no longer felt to 
be in need of treatment, he or she must 
be released from compulsory status 
• Where the patient is considered to be in 
need of further asmsment and 
treatment, copies of the certificate are 
sent, with a statement of legal 
consequences, to: . the patient; . any welfare guardian; . the applicant; . the principal care giver; . the patient's usual doctor; . a district inspector; . an official visitor . 
• 
The responsible clinician applies to 
the court for a compulsory treatment 
order. 
• The responsible clinician notifies the 
patient in writing of the requirement 
to undergo further assessment and 
treatment for 14 days from the date 
on which the second assessment period 
would have expired. 
' The district inspector speaks with the patient and ascertains the patient's 
views. The Inspector considers whether 
to attend, and be heard by, the Court. 
• 
If application cannot be heard within 
14 days, a Judge may extend the final 
period for up to one month. 
' Where the application is not determined by the expiry of the final 
period, it must be dismissed and the 
patient must be immediately released 
from compulsory status. 
,_ 
4 
Reg.! 
Mental Health (Forms) Regulation, 1992 
SCHEDULES 
FIRST SCHEDULE 
FORMS 
Form 1 
Front 
1992/305 
Section 76 (J), Mental Health (Compu/Jory A.sswment and Treatment) Act I 992 
CERTIFICATE OF CLINICAL REVIEW OF CONDITION OF PATIENT SUBJECT TO 
, COMPULSORY TREATMENT ORDER 
To: The Director of Area 
Mental Health Services, at: 
Name of patient: 
P.tticnt's date of birth: 
of. 
Location 
Full narnt 
Datt of birth 
Addmi 
who is subject to a compulsory treatment order that 
Section and Act undtr which corn ulio ordtr rnadt 
wu made under: 
Cornrntnarntnl dolt o corn ulio order in om 
and commenced on: 
Expiry dolt of compuliory ordtr in fora 
and is in force until: 
e 
e 
e e 
1992/305 Jvfenlal I I ealth (FoY-m:1.) RegulaUoru J 992 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form I-continued 
Front-continued 
I have examined the patient and have consulted with . other health 
professionals involved in the treatment and care of the patient an~ have 
taken their views into account when assessing the results of my review of 
the patient's condition. 
In my opinion: 
•nelttt ont 
·(i) 
or 
The patient is fit to be released from compulsory statu<. 
0 (ii) The patient is not fit to be released from compulsory 
status. 
CopieJ of Certificate 
Where I am of the opinion that the patient is not fit to be released from 
compulsory status, I shall be sending a copy of this certificate to each of 
the following: (tick those applicable) 
0 The Review Tribunal 
D The patient 
O Any welfare guardian of the patient 
O The patient's principal caregiver 
O The medical practitioner who usually attended the patient 
immediately before the patient was required to undergo assessment 
and treatment 
D A district inspector 
0 An official visitor 
I shall be enclosing with each copy of this certificate a statement of-
(a) The legal consequences of the above finding; and 
(b) The right of-
(i) The patient; or 
(ii) Any welfare guardian of the patient; or 
(iii) The patient's principal caregiver; or 
(iv) The medical practitioner who attended the patient 
immediately before the patient was required to undergo 
assessment and treatment under Part I of the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992,-
to apply to the Review Tribunal for a review o( the patient's condition. 
6 Men ta l ffealth (Fonn~) R egulations 1 992 1 992/3 0 5 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form 1-continued 
Front-continued 
Rea.sons and Reports 
I shall be sending to the Director of Area Mental Health Services, with this 
certificate, full particulars of the reasons for my opinion of the pa~ient's 
condition and any relevant reports from other health professionals 
involved in the case .. 
Name o re1 rtJible clinician who conducted the rroiew 
This certificate is issued by: 
Bwine11 addrw and tele/Jhone number of re1/)ortJible clinician 
of. 
I I 
Signature of mport.!ible clinician Dalt 
e 
1 992/305 M en t a l f-Teal th (Forrru) Reg ula tions J 992 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form I-continued 
Back 
Statement of Legal Consequences of Finding that Patient is 
not fit to be released from Compulsory Status 
and 
Statement of Right to Apply to Review Tribunal 
Legal Consequences 
Where, on a clinical review under section 7 6 of the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 of the condition 
of a patient, the responsible clinician is of the opinion that the 
patient is not fit to be released from compulsory status, that 
patient will be required to continue to undergo treatment under that 
Act. 
Application to Review Tribunal 
There is however a further step that may be taken. 
Each of the following persons, namely,-
(a) The patient: , 
(b) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(c) The patient's principal caregiver: 
(d) The medical practitioner who usually attended the patient 
immediately before the patient was required to undergo 
assessment and treatment under Part I of the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992,-
may apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of the patient's 
condition. 
If any such person wishes to apply to the Review Tribunal, that 
person may seek help from-
(a) A district inspector: 
(b) An official visitor: 
(c) His or her lawyer: 
(d) The patient's responsible clinician: 
(e) A patient advocate (if one is available). 
Steps to be taken by DiJtrict Inspector 
The district inspector who receives a copy of this certificate (or an 
official visitor acting under an arrangement with that district 
inspector) must, after talking to the patient and ascertaining the 
patient's wishes in the matter, consider whether or not an 
application should be made to the Review Tribunal for a review of 
the patient 's condition. 
If that district inspector or any such official visitor considers that 
such an application should be made, that district inspector or that 
official visitor is required to take whatever reasonable steps he or she 
thinks necessary to encourage or assist the patient, or any of the 
other prrsons rntitlrcl to ;ipplv to thl" Trih11n;il . to m~k,. swh ;m 
"'IV')ir,.,.Wa.-
8 /1,,fental /-fealth ('For,ns.,) RegulaLlon.s I 992 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form I-continued 
Back-continued 
1 992/305 
If that district inspector or any such official visito.r c~nsiders .t?at 
an application should be made to have the patients cond1t1on 
reviewed by the Review Tribunal, but neither ~he .Patient no~ ~y 
other person intends to make such an apphcat1on, the d1stnct 
inspector or any such official visitor may r~port t~e matter to t~e 
Review Tribunal; and, in such a case, the ReVlew Tnbunal may, of its 
own motion, review the patient's condition under section 79 of the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 as 
if an appropriate application for such a review had been made to the 
Review Tribunal. 
Finding of Review Tribunal 
The Review Tribunal, on conducting such a review, may find 
that-
(a) The patient is fit to be released from compulsory status; or 
(b) The patient is not fit to be released from compulsory status. 
Further Information 
For further information about the Review Tribunal, see sections 
79, 82, and IOI to 107 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment 
and Treatment) Act 1992. 
e 
e 
1992/305 Mental I leallh (Forrn.s) Regulat,on..s I 992 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form 2 
Front 
Section 77 (J), Mental Health (Compulsory As.seJJment and Treatment) Act 1992 
CERTIFICATE OF CLINICAL REVIEW OF CONDITION OF SPECIAL PATIENT FOUND 
TO BE UNDER DISABILITY AND DETAINED PURSUANT TO ORDER MADE UNDER 
SECTION 115 (I) (a), CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT I 985 
To: The Director of Area 
Mental Health Services, at: 
Name of patient: 
Patient's date of birth: 
of: 
location 
Full name 
Datt of birth 
AddrtJJ 
who was found to be under disability and who is detained pursuant to an 
order made under section I 15 ( 1) (a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and 
dated: 
Dale of court order 
I have examined the patient and have consulted with other health 
professionals involved in the treatment and care of the patient and have 
taken their views into account when assessing the results of my review of 
the patient's condition. 
24 
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FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form 5 
Front 
I 992/.305 
Stclion 79 (7), Mmtal Htalth (Compulsory Asmsmmt and Treatment) Act 1992 
CERTIFlCATE OF TRIBUNAL REVIEW OF CONDITION OF PATIENT SUBJECT TO 
COMPULSORY TREATMENT ORDER 
To: The Director of Area 
Mental HeaJth Services, at: 
location 
The Review Tribunal has reviewed the condition of 
Full name 
Name of patient: 
Dalt of birth 
Patient's date of birth: 
Addrt11 
of: 
who is subject to a compulsory treatment order that 
Section and Act undtr which corn I.so order was madt 
was made under 
Commmammt <Ultt o corn ul.so order in orct 
and commenced on 
Expiry dalt of compulsory ordtr in fora 
and is in force until: 
1992/.305 Mental I lealth (Forrn~) llegulallon.s 1992 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form 5-continued 
Front-continued 
The review of the patient's 
condition was conducted by 
the Review Tribunal: 0 (i) I Of its own motion 
~------------------~ 
OT 
·nelttt ont 0 (ii) On the application of 
Namt 
In reviewing the patient's condition, the Review Tribunal has complied 
with the provisions of the First Schedule to the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
In the opinion of the 
Tribunal: 0 (i) The patient is fit to be released from compulsory status. 
• Dtlttt ont or 
0 (ii) The patient is not fit to be released from compulsory 
status. 
Copies of Certificate 
Where the Review Tribunal is of the opinion that the patient is not fit to be 
released from compulsory status, the convener of the Review Tribunal will 
send a copy of this certifICate to each of the following: (tick thou applicable) 
O The Director of Mental Health 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
The responsible clinician 
The patient 
Any welfare guardian of the patient 
The patient's principal caregiver 
The medical practitioner who usually attended the patient 
immediately before the patient was required to undergo assessment 
and treatment under Part I of the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 
0 A district inspector 
0 An official visitor 
26 Menta l Health (For,n.s) Regulallo rz J .I 992 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form 5-continued 
Front-continued 
1992/ 305 
The convener of the Review Tribunal will enclose with each copy of that 
certificate a statement of-
{a) The legal consequences of the Review Tribunal's decision; and 
(b) The right of-
(i) The patient; or 
(ii) Any welfare guardian of the patient; or 
(iii) The patient's principal caregiver; or 
(iv) The medical practitioner who attended the patient 
immediately before the patient was required to undergo 
assessment and treatment under Part I of the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992,-
to appeal to a District Court against the decision. 
I I 
Signatur( of Convma of Rroitw Tribunal Dai( 
1992 / 3 0 5 Ment a l .llealtla ( F o rTnJ.) R eguLo.tio n .s 1 992 
FlRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form 5-continued 
Back 
Statement of Legal Conse9uences of Decision of Review 
Tribunal that Patient 1s not fit to be rele:ued from 
Compulsory Status 
and 
Statement of Right to Appeal to a District Court 
Legal ConsequenctJ 
Where, on a review under section 79 of the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 of the condition 
of a patient, the Review Tribunal finds that the patient is not fit to 
be rcle:ued from compulsory status, that patient will be required 
to continue to undergo treatment under that Act. 
Right to Appeal to a DiJtrict Court 
There is however a further step that may be taken. 
Each of the following persons, namely,-
(a) The patient: 
(b) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(c) The patient's principal caregiver: 
(d) The medical practitioner who usually attended the patient 
immediately before the patient was required to undergo 
assessment and treatment under Part I of the Meneal 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
1992,-
may, within I month after the date of the Review Tribunal's 
decision, appeal co a District Court against that decision. 
If any such person wishes to appeal to a District Court against the 
decision, that person may seek help from-
(a) A district inspector: 
(b) An official visitor: 
(c) His or her lawyer: 
(d) The patient's responsible clinician: 
{e) The staff of the nearest District Court. 
Steps to be taken by DiJtrict Inspector 
The district inspector who receives a copy of this certificate (or an 
official visitor acting under an arrangement with that district 
inspector), must, after talking to the patient and ascertaining the 
patient's wishes in the matter, consider whether or not an appeal 
should be made to a District Court against the Review Tribunal's 
decision. 
If the district inspector or any such official visitor considers that 
such an appeal should be made, that district inspector or that official 
visitor shall take whatever steps he or she thinks necessary to 
encourage or assist the patient, or any of the other persons entitled 
to appeal, to make such ;m aprH·al. 
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FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
Form 5-continued 
Back-continued 
1992/305 
If that district inspector or any such official visitor considers that 
an appeal against the Review Tribunal's decision should be made, 
but neither the patient nor any other per:t0n intends to make such 
an appeal, the district inspector or any such olfICial visitor may 
report the matter to a District Court; and, in such a case, a District 
Court Judge may, of his or her own motion, review the patient's 
condition as if an appropriate appeal had been made to the District 
Court. 
Determination of District Court 
On any such appeal, the District Court shall review the patient!s 
condition to determine whether or not the patient is fit to be 
released from compulsory status. 
Further Information 
For further information about the review of a patient's condition 
on an appeal, see sections 16 and 83 of the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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Mental Health (Compul.sory 
k.se.s.sment and Treatment) 
3 
119. FurthCT offences involving false or ITU5· 
leading documcnu, etc. 
120. Offences punish.able on sununary 
conviction 
12 I. G<neral penalty 
122. Matten of justification or excuse 
PART X1 
Ml5CE.L1A-" c.OUS P'ROVIS!ONS 
l 2S. Vetting of incoming mail 
124 . Vetting of outgoing mail 
I 25. Procedure ... -here letter ,.;thhcld 
126. P,tiem·s pock.et money 
127. Transfer of patienu 
128. Removal from Ne"· Z.ealand 
129. Rcgisten and records 
ISO. Dircctor-GcnCTal may promulga.te 
stand.i.rds 
IS I. Notices to Director-GcnCTal 
1 S2. Notice of death 
!SS. General pro,-isioru :u to notices. etc. 
I S4 . Fees of medial pnctitioncn 
IS.S. R.eguhtions . 
I S6. Application of othCT Act.s 
IS7. Repeals and consequential amcndmenu 
l S8. Savings 
I S9. Criminal Justice Act I 98.S ;a.mended 
140. Armed forces Discipline Act I 971 
;a.mended 
PART XII 
TllANsmoNAL PROVISIONS 
14 I. Persons detained under section 1 9 of 
Mental Health Aa I 969 
142. Proceedings for reception ordCT corn· 
menced but not completed 
HS . Reception ordcn 
lH. Committed patienu on leave 
14.S. S~ patienu 
146. Persons detained :u committed patienu 
pursuant to Criminal Justice Act 198.S 
Schedules 
An Act to redefine the circumstances in which and the 
conditions under which persons may be subjected to 
compulsory psychiatric assessment and treatment, to 
define the rights of such persons and to provide better 
protection for those rights, and generally to reform 
and consolidate the law relating to the a.ssessment and 
treatment of persons suffering from mental disorder 
BE IT ENACTED by the Parliament of New Zealand as follows: 
1. Short Title and commencement-( l) This Act may be 
cited as the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the 1st day of 
November 1992. 
~. lntcrprctation-(1) In this Act, unless the context 
otherwise requires,-
"Board" means an area health board: 
"Clinician" means a person who holds a professional 
qualification relevant to the assessment, treatment, 
and care of patients with mental disorder: 
"Court" means a District Court: 
"Deputy Director" means the person who for the time 
being holds the office of Deput)' Director of Mental 
Health pursuant to section 91 of this Act: 
"Director" means the person who for the time being holds 
the office of Director of Mental Health pursuant to 
section 91 of this Act: 
4 
,f. 
_i-; . 
Mmtal Htalth (Compulsory 
AJJ'"mtnl and TrtaJmmt) 
"Director of Area Mental Health Services", in relation to a 
Board, means the person appointed by the Board 
punuant to section 92 of this Act to be the Board's 
I:>irector of Area Mental Health Services for the 
purposes of this Act: 
"District inspector" means a person appointed pursuant to 
section 94 of this Act to be a district inspector; and 
includes a penon appointed pursuant to that section 
to be a deputy district inspector: 
"Duly authorised officer" means a person whc., is 
designated and authorised by a Board under section 
9S of this Act to perform the functions and exercise 
the powen conferred on duly authorised officers by 
or under this Act: 
"Fit to be released from compulsory statw", in relation to 
a patient, means no longer mentally disordered and 
fit to be released from the requirement of assessment 
or treatment under this Act: 
"Hospital" means-
(a) A hospital managed by an area health board; 
and 
(b) A private hospital licensed as a psychiatric 
:iital pursuant to Part V of the Hospitals Act 195 7; 
(c) An institution that was, immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, a licensed institution 
under section 9 of the Mental Health Act 1969: 
"Medical officer" means a medical practitioner, other than 
a medical superintendent, employed by a Board: 
"Medical practitioner" means a person registered as a 
medical practitioner under the Medical Practitioners 
Act 1968: 
"Mental disorder", in relation to any person, means an 
abnormal ,ute of mind (whether of a continuow or 
an intermittent ruture), dw-acterised by delwions, or 
by disorder, of mood or perception or volition or 
cognition, of such a degree that 1t-
(a) Poses a serious da.nger to the health or ufety of 
that person or of others; or 
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person 
to take care of himself or her1elf;-
and "mentally disordered", in relation to any such 
eerson, has a corresr:,nding meaning: 
"Minmer" means the Mmi.ster of Health: 
institution: 
"Principal caregiver", in relation to any patient, means the 
friend of tbe patient or the member of the patient's 
family group or whanau who is most evidently and 
directly concerned with the oversight of the patient's 
care and welfare: 
"Psychiatric security institution" means a hospital, or part 
of a hospital, declared under section 100 of this Act to 
be a psychiatric security institution: 
"Psychiatnst" means a medical practitioner re~tered as a 
psychiatric specialist under rel(U!auons made 
pursuant to section S9 of the Medical Practitioners 
Act 1968: 
"Registrar" means the Registrar of a District Coun: 
"Responsible clinician", in relation to a patient, means the 
clinician in charge of the treatment of that patient: 
"Restricted patient" means a patient who is declared to be 
a restricted patient by the Court under section 55 of 
this Act: 
"Service" means a service for the treatment and 
rehabilitation of persons with mental disorder, being 
a service provided by, or managed by,-
(i) A board; or 
(ii) A private hospital licensed as a psychiatric 
institution pursuant to Part V of the Hospitals Act 
1957; or 
(iii) An institution that was, immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, a licensed institution 
under section 9 of the Mental Health Act 1969: 
"Special patient" means a person who is-
(a) Subject to an order made under section 115 or 
section 121 of the Criminal Jwtice Act 1985, or to an 
;-., ;; 
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(a) Apply to the Court for the making of a compulsory 
treatment order under Part I of this Act· and (b) Send a copy of ~e certificate of final assessm0ent to each of the folowmg pcnoru: (!) The patient: 
(~) Any welfare guardian of the patient: (~) The applicant for assessment: 
(1v) The patient's principal caregiver: 
th (v) Th~ me<;ilcal practiuoner who wualy atended e pauent unmediately before the patient was 
~~wred to un_dergo assessment and treatment under 
u113 Part of this Act: 
(~) A district ins~tor: 
(vu) An oficial V1Sitor. 
(5) To e~ch of the persons specified in subpara a hs (i) to ~subsecuon (4) (b) of this section, the responsiblr clkician s~ 
o send. a statement of the legal consequences of the find.in 
act. ~ut ,111 _the certificate of final .uscssment and of th! recipient s nght to appear before the Court and b  h  d . 
re(~)~h~f t aJ>pli~uon for a compuuory treatm:it i~er.111 certifi f tnct 111Spector who receives a copy of the this cat_e O ~ ~~~~~  shal, subject to subsection (7) of secuon, .uter t&UJJ,g to the pati t d . . patient's wish · th en an ascenauung the . es 111 e mater where that can be de ~ons1der whether or not to appear ~efore the Court to b honed), 111 respect of the li · for e ear (7) lrutead of~ c.a~on or a compulsobeatment order. 
in subsection (6) of ~g persothru.1.1~,_th~ . ctions specified . secuon, e w.,tnct 111Spector ma in 
thany parucular case arrange for an oficial vuitor to pe~nn em. 
16: S~tua of patient pending determination f apphcauon-(1) Where the responsible clini · li 0 Court for the muin f cw, app es to the patient shal remain g~bl a compulsory treatment order, the 
accordance with the t e to ass~sm~t and treatment in 
(I) of section I !I of ~~  thd ~uce given ~der su_b~ection 
that section until the ex · :; e ~cceeding proV1S1ons of 
date on which the •econSl)' .od arod of 14 diy, after the would oth....:·e ha .l'et:1ed. 0 assessment and treatment ~· nu vc expir 
A (2) ~· aftr e~amining th~ eatient under section 18 of this 
d;t~~~h!:~u!a!: ::th that \~ 't practicable to 
to in subsection (I) of this section eJ:7Judgoe mal4 days r~fer_ed • y, by 111tenm 
• 
Mmtal H,alth (Compubory 
AJunmtnt and Trta/mmt) 
17 
order, extend that period for a funher period not exceeding l 
month. 
(S) If the application is not finaly determined before the 
expiry of the period of 14 days referred to in subsection (1) of 
this section, or within the last extension of that period ordered 
under subsection (2) of this section, the apelication shal be 
dismissed, and the patient shal be released from comeulsory 
status (but without prejudice to the ma.king of a funher 
application under secuon 8 of this Act in respect of the patient 
at some time in the future). 
16. Review of patient's condition by Judgc-(1) Where 
an application is made to the Court under section 11 (7) or 
section 12 (7) or section 12 (12) of this Act for a review of the 
patient's condition, a judge shal examine the patient as soon as 
practicable. 
(2) The examination shal be conducted-
(a) At the patient's place of residence, the hospital, or the 
other place where the patient is undergoing assessment and treatment; or 
(b) Where that is not practicable, at the nearest practicable 
place. 
(S) Before examining the patient, the Judge shal (wherever 
and so far as practicable)-
(a) Identify himself or herself to the patient; and 
(b) Explain to the patient the purpose of the vuit; and (c) Discuss with tbe patient the patient's situation, the 
proposed course of assessment and treatment, and 
the patient's views on these maters. 
(4) As wel as exarnininli the patient, the judge shal consult 
with the responsible clinician, and with at least I other health 
professional involved in the case, and may consult with such 
other persons as the Judge thinks fit, concerning the patient's 
condi11on. 
(5) If the Judge is satisfied that the patient is fit to be released 
from compulsory statw, the Judge shal order that the patient 
be released from that status fonhwith. 
(6) Every review under this section of a patient's condition 
shal, wherever practicable, having regard to the time in which 
that review is required to be conducted, and to the availability 
of judges and other persormel and resources, be conducted by 
a Family Coun judge. 
(71 Where it is not p.racticable for a review under this section (·</ a patie_nt's condiu~ ~e c.:lnduc~ed by,_~~y~Co~--
. 1. Judge, that review may be conducted by any District Court 
Judge. 
', 
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76. Complaint of breach of righu-(1) Where a 
complaint is made by or on behalf of a patient that any right 
conferred on the patient by this Pan of this Act has been 
denied or breached in some way, the matter 1hall be referred 
to a district irupector or an official visitor for investigation. 
(2) If, after talking with the patient, the compwnant (where 
that is not the patient), and everyone else involved in the case, 
and generally investigating the matter, the district irupector or 
official visitor is satisfied that the complaint has substance, the 
district iruecctor or official visitor 1hall report the matter to the 
Director of Area Mental Health Services, together with such 
recommendatioru a.s the district irupector or official visitor 
thinks fit, and the Director of Area Mental Health Services shall 
take all such steps as may be necessary to rectify the matter. 
(S) On concluding any investigation =der this section, the 
district irupector or official visitor 1hall also inform the patient 
or other complainant of his or her findings. 
(4) If the patient or other complainant is not satisfied with 
the ?utC<?f!le of the complaint to the district irupector or the 
official vu1tor, he or she may refer the case to the Review 
Tribunal for further investigation; and, in any such case, the 
provisioru of subsection (2) of this section, with any necessary 
modifications, shall apply. 
PART VII 
REVIEWS AND JUDICIAL INQ.UIRIES 
76. Clinical review, of persona aubjcct to compulsory 
treatment orden-(1) The responsible clinician shall conduct 
a formal review of the condition of every patient, other than a 
restricted patient, who is subject to a compulsory treatment 
order-
(a) Not later than 3 months after the date of the order; and 
(b) Thereafter at interval, of not longer than 6 months. 
(2) For the purposes of any such review, the resporuible 
clinician shall-
(a) Examine the patient; and 
(b) Coruult with other health _professionals involved in the 
treatment and care of the patient, and take their 
views into account when assessin~ the results of his or 
her review of the patient's condition. 
(S) At the conclusion of any such review, the resporuible 
clinician shall record his or her findings in a certificate of 
clinical review in the prescribed form, stating-
Mtntal Health (Compulsory 
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(a) That in his or her opinion the patient is fit to be released 
from compulsory status; or 
(b) That in his or her opinion the patient is not fit to be 
released from that status. 
( 4) The resporuible clinician shall send to the Director of 
Area Mental Health Services-
(a) The certificate of clinical review; 3:1d .. 
(b) Full particulars of the reasoru for his or her opiruon of the 
patient's condition, and any relevant reports from 
other health professionals involved in the case. 
(5) If the responsible clinician is of the opinion that .the 
patient is fit to oe released from compulsory status, the pauent 
shall be released from that status accordingly, and the 
compulsory treatment order shall be deemed to have been 
revoked. 
(6) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (5) of this se~tio~, 
if the patient is a special patient he or s~e slwl be d~alt with m 
accordance with subsection (I) of section 4 7 of this Act, and 
subsections (3) and (5) of that section shall apply. 
(7) If the responsible clinician is of the opinion that the 
patient is not fit to be released from compulsory status, that 
officer shall send a copy of the certificate of clinical review to-
(a) The Review Tribunal; and 
(b) Each of the follo"'ing persons: 
(i) The patient: 
(ii) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(iii) The patient's principal caregiver: 
(iv) The medical practitioner who usually attended 
the patient immediately before the patient was 
required to undergo assessment and treatment under 
Part I of this Act: 
(v) A district inspector: 
(vi) An official visitor. 
(8) To each of the perso~ speci.fied in subpara~aph~ (i), to 
(iv) of subsection (7) (b) of this secuon the responsible clinician 
shall also send a statement of the legal coruequences of the 
finding set out in the certificate of clinical review, and of the 
recipient 's right to apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of 
the patient's condition. 
(9) Subject to su~section ( 12) of this sec.tion, the ~t~ct 
inspector who receive~ a copy of ~he certificate o.f .clinical 
review shall, after talking to the patient and ascerta.uung the 
patient's wishes in the matter, consider whether or not an 
.r" 
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appliation should be made lo the Review Tribunal for a review of r.he patient's condition. 
{ I0) If the district uupeclor considers r.hat such an application should be made, the district uupcclor aha.l we whatever 
re~nable sl.eps he or she thinks necessary to encourage or 
amsl r.he paUenl, or any _person specified in subparagraphs (i) to (i~) ~f subsection (7) (b) of this section, to male such an appliauon. 
(I .1) If, in ~y ~. to which sub~ection (9) of this section applies, the distnct uupcctor coru1ders r.hat an application 
should be made to have the patient's condition reviewed by the 
Revi~w ~ribunal, but neither the J>atient nor any person 
spe~ified. 111 subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of subsection (7) (b) of this !ecuon mtends to male such an application, the district 
!1"15pector may repon r.h~ mal~ to r.he levie~ Tribunal; and, 
m ~uch a case.' r.h; RCVJ~~ Tnbunal ~y, of 1u own motion, re~ew the eauent s condmon under section 79 or section 80 of 
this Act as if an appropriate appliation for such a review had been made lo the Review Tribunal. 
. ( 12) Irut.ead of pmorming personaly r.he functions specified m su~secuons (9). to { 11) of r.his section, r.he district inspector may 111 any parucular case arrange for an oficial visitor to perform them. 
77. C_linle~ i:e.vlew, of certain 1pecial patienU-(1) The res~1:51ble clinician shal conduct a formal review of the 
condition of every special patient who is detained in a hosrital pursuant to an order of a court made under section 115 o the Criminal Justice Act 1985-
(a) Not later than 3 months after the date of r.he order· and 
(b) Thereafter al intervals of not longer than 6 months'. 
(2.J The provisi.oru of subsections (2), (4), and (8) to (12) of 
section 7.6 of ~ Ac~ ~hal apply ~ respect of every review under r.his secuon as if 1t were a rCVJew under r.hat section. 
(3) In the case. of a special patient who was ordered to be 
de~.ed folowmg a finding . of disability, . the folowing proV151ons shal apply to any rCVJew of r.hat pauent's condition under this section: 
(a) At the conclusion ~f the review, the responsible clinician 
~~ recor~ ~ or her findings in a cenifiate of clinical reVJew m the prescribed form, stating-
(i) That in his or her opinion the patient is no longer under disability; or 
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(i) That in his or her opinion the patient is stil under disability but it is no longer necessary r.hat the 
patient should be subject to the order of detention as 
a special patient; or 
(Li) That in his or her opinion r.he patient is stil 
under disability and should continue to be subject to 
the order of detention as a special patient: 
(b) In every case, the responsible clinician shal send a copy of 
the cenificate of clinical review to-
(i) The Review Tribunal; and 
(i) The Director; and 
(ii) E.ach of the persons specified in section 
7 6 (7) (b) of this Act: 
(c) In any case where the respansible clinician is of the opinion that the patient is no longer under disability, 
or that the patient is stil under disability but it is no 
longer necessary that the patient should be subject to 
the order of detention as a special patient, that 
clinician shal also send a copy of r.he cenificate of 
clinical review to the Atorney-General for the 
purposes of section 116 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1985: 
(d) Notwithstanding anything in section 116 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985, on receiving a copy of the cenificate 
of clinical review pursuant to paragraph (c) of this subsection, the Atorney-General may, instead of 
exercising the powers conferred by that section, 
apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of the patient's condition. 
(4) In the case of a special patient who was ordered to be 
detained folowing acquital on account of insanity, the 
folowing provisions shal apply to any review of that patient's 
condition under this section: 
(a) At the conclusion of the review, the responsible clinician 
shal record his or her findings in a cenificate of 
clinical review, stating whether or not, in his or her 
opinion, the patient's condition stil requires, cir.her in 
the patient's own interest or for the safety of the 
public, that he or she should be subject to the order 
of detention as a special patient: 
(b) In every case, the responsible clinician shal send a copy of 
the cen ificate of clinical review to-
(i) The Review Tribunal; and 
(i) The Director; and 
>, 
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(iii) Each of the pcnoru specified in section 
76 (7) (b) of this Act: 
(c) In any case where the responsible clinician is of the 
opinion that the patient's condition no longer 
requires either in the patient'• own interest or for the 
safety of the public, that he or she should be subject 
to the order of detention as a special patient, that 
clinician shall also send a copy of the certificate of 
clinical review to the Minister of Health for the 
purposes of section 11 7 of the Crimiruu Justice Act 
1985: 
(d) Notwithstanding anrhing in_s~tion 117 of the C~ 
Justice Act 198 , on recctvmg a copy of the certificat.e 
of clinical review pursuant to paragraph /c) of this 
subsection, the Muu.stcr of Health may, uutead of 
exercising the powers conferred by that section, 
apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of the 
patient's condition. 
71. Clinical rnlewa of restricted patie~U-(1) The 
responsible clinician shall conduct a formal reV1ew of the 
condition of every restricted patient-
(a) Not later tlwl S months after the date of the order 
declaring the patient to be a restricted patient; and 
(b) Thereafter at intervals of not longer tlwl 6 months. 
(2)The provisions of subsections (2~ (4), and (8) to (12). of 
section 7 6 of this Act shall apply in respect of every ~eV1ew 
under this section as if it were a review under that secuon. 
(S) At the conclusion of.the ~evicw, ~e respo~i~le clini? an 
shall record his or her findings tn a certificate of clinical reVlew, 
st
a(~~t in his or her opinion the patient is fit to be released 
from compulsory status; or 
(bpbat in his or her opinion the patient is not fit to be 
released from compulsory status but it is no longer 
nece5$ary that the patient should be declared to be a 
restricted patient; or 
(c) That in his or her opinion the patient is not fit to be 
released from compulsory status and should continue 
to be declared to be a restricted patient. 
(4 ) The responsible clinician shall send a copy of the 
cenificate of c1inical review to-
(a) The Review Tribunal; and 
(b) The Director; and 
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(c) Each of the persons specified in section 76 (7) (b) of this 
Act. 
\5) 1n any case where the responsible clinician is of the 
opmion that the patient is fit to be released from compulsory 
status, the Director shall either-
(a) Direct that the patient be released from that status 
fonhwith; or 
(b) Apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of the patient's 
condition. 
(6) In any case where the responsible clinician is of the 
opinion that the patient is not fit to be released fi:om 
compulsory status but it is no longer necess~ that the pau~nt 
should be declared to be a restricted patient, the followmg 
provisions shall apr.ly: 
(a) The responsible clinician shall send _a. copy of the 
certificate of clinical review to the MllllSter of Health: 
(b) The Minister of Health shall , after consultation with the 
Attorney-General, either~ . 
(i) Revoke the declaration that the patient shall be a 
restricted patient; or . . . 
(ii) Apply to the ReVleW Tnbunal for a reVleW of the 
patient s condition. 
79. Tribunal reviews of penons subject to compulsory 
treatment orden-(1) Any person to wh~m a copy . of a 
certificate of clinical review is sent under section 7 6 of this Act 
may apply to the Review Tribunal for a review of the patient's 
condit1on. 
(2) Without limiting anything in subsection (I) of this 
section,-
(a) The Review Tribunal may at any t~e, of its.own _motion, 
review the conrution of any patient who is subJeCt to a 
compulsory treatment orde~: . . . 
(b) On receiving a copy of a ceruficate of ~cal ~eV1ew 
under section 76 of this Act, the ReV1ew Tnbunal 
shall consider wpether or not it should, of its own 
mot ion, review the patient's condition. . 
(S) Where it appears that for any reason a formal reV1ew of a 
patient who is subject to a compulsory treatment order has not 
ta.ken place as required by s:cti~n 7 6 ~f. this ~et, the .Review 
Tribunal may review the patients condit1on, either of llS own 
motion or on application by any/erson to whom .a copy of a 
cenifica te of clinical review woul have been reqwred to have 
been sent if the review had been held. 
,~ ... 
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· (4) Every application to the Tribunal under this section shall 
be addrened to the convener of the Review Tribunal. 
(5) Subject to subsection (6) of thil section, on receipt of such 
an application the convener ,hall arrange for the Review 
Tribunal to review the patient's condition a.s soon a.s practicable 
and in no case later than 14 days after the receipt of the 
application. 
(6) Notwithstanding anr. of the preceding provisions of this 
section, the Review Tnbunal may refuse to consider an 
applicacion for review-
(a) If it has coruidered an application for review of the 
patient's condition within the preceding !I months, 
and the certificate of clinical review states that there 
~ beei; no ch_ange in the patient's condition in the 
mterverung penod; or 
(b) In the case of an application made by a relative or friend 
of the _patient, the Tribunal is satisfied that the 
applica~1on is made otherwise than in the interests of 
tfie pauent. 
(7) Al the conclusion of any such review, the Review Tribunal 
shall set out iu fmdings in a certificate of Tribunal review in the 
prescribed form, Slating whether or not, in its opinion, the 
patient is fit to be released from compulsory status. 
(8) If the Review Tribunal considers that the patient is fit to 
be released from compulsory status, the patient shall be 
released from that status accordingly. 
(9) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (8) of this section, 
if the patient is a special patient he or she shall be dealt with in 
accordance with subsecuon ( 1) of section 4 7 of this Act, and 
subsections (!I) and (5) of that section shall apply. 
(10) If the Review Tribunal considers that the patient is not 
fit to be released from compulso7. status, the convener shall 
send a copy of the certificate of Tnbunal review to each of the 
following: 
(a) The Director. 
(b) The Director of Area Mental Health Services: 
(c) The responsible clinician: 
(d) The patient: 
(e) Any welfare guardian of the patient: 
(~ The patient's principal caregiver: 
(g) The medical practiuoner who usually attended the patient 
irrunediately before the patient was required to 
undergo assessment and treatment under Part I of 
this Act: 
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(h) A district inspector: 
(i) An official visitor. 
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( 11) To each of the persons specified in paragraphs (d) to (g) 
of subsection ( I 0) of this section, the convener shall also send a 
statement of the legal consequences of the decision, and of the 
recipient's right to appeal to the Court against the decision. 
( 12) Subject to subsection (15) of this section, the district 
inspector who receives a copy of the certificate of Tribunal 
review shall , after talking to the patient and ascertaining the 
patient's wishes in the matter, consider whether or not an 
apP.eal should be made to the Court against the Review 
Tnbunal's decision. 
(1 S) If the district inspector considers that such an appeal 
should be made, the district inspector shall take whatever steps 
he or she thinks necessary to encourage or assist the patient, or 
any person specified in paragraphs (e) to (g) of subsection ( I 0) of 
this section, lo make such an appeal. 
(14) If, in any case to which subsection ( 12) of this section 
applies, the district inspector considers that an appeal against 
the Review Tribunal's decision should be made, but neither the 
patient nor any person specified in paragraphs (e) to (g) of 
subsection (I 0) of this section intends to make such an appeal, 
the djstricl inspector may report the matter lo the Court; and, 
in such a case, a Judge may, of his or her own motion, revie.w 
the patient's condition as if an appropriate appeal had been 
made to the Court. 
(15) Instead of performmg personally the functions specified 
in subsections (I 2) to (14) of this section, the district ins_pector 
may in any particular case arrange for an official visitor to 
perform them. 
80. Tribunal reviews of certain special patienu-
( I} Any person to whom a copy of a certificate of clirucal review 
is sent under section 7 7 of this Act may apply to the Review 
Tribunal for a review of the patient's condiuon. 
(2) Without J.imjting anything in subsection (1) of this section, 
the Review Tribunal shall review the patient's condition on the 
application of the Attorney-General pursuant to subsection 
(S) (d) of section 7 7 of this Act or of the Minister of Health 
pursuant to subsection (4) (d) of that section. 
(S) The provisions of subsections (2) to (6) of section 79 of this 
Act shall apply in respect of every review under this section as 
if it were a review under that section. 
i 
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(a) The convener of the Review Tribwi.al shall send a copy of 
the certifiute of Tribwi.al review to the Minister of 
Health: 
(b) The Minister of Health shall, after consultation with the 
Attorney-General, either-
(i) Revoke the declaration that the patient shall be a 
restricted patient; or 
(ii) Decline to revoke that declaration. 
112. Procedural provi1ion1-The provisions set out in the 
First Schedule to this Act shall apply in respect of a review of _a 
patient's condition by a Review Tribwi.al under this Part of this 
Act. 
11!1. Appeal apimt Review Tribunal', decision in 
certain cue,-( 1) Where, on a review under section 7 9 of this 
Act, the Review Tribunal considers that the patient is not fit to 
be released from compulsory statw, any person specified in 
para~aplu (d) to (g) of subsection (10) of that section may, 
within I month .i.Tter the date of the Review Tribunal's 
decision, appeal to the Court agairut that decision. 
(2) On any such appeal, the Court shall review the patient's 
condition to detemune whether or not the patient is fit to be 
released from compulsory statw; and the provisions of section 
16 of this Act shall apply, with any necessary modifications, to 
every such appeal. 
!If.Judicial inquiry-(!) A Judge of the High Court may 
whenever the Judge thinks fit, whether of the Judge's own 
motion or on the application of any person, mike an order 
directing a district inspector or any one or more/ersons whom 
the Judge may select in that behalf to visit an examine any 
person who the Judge has reason to believe is being detained in 
a hospital as a patient and to inquire into and report on such 
matters relating to that person a, the Judge thinks fit. 
(2) A Judge of the High Cow-t may whenever the Judge 
thfuh fit, whether of the Judge', own motion or on tfie 
application of any person, and whether any order under 
subsection (1) of this section hu been made or not, male an 
order directing the responsible clinician to bring any person 
who is being aetained as a patient in the hospital before the 
Judge in o~n Court or in Chambers, for examination at a time 
to be specified in the order. 
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(S) If, on the examination of the person so ordered to be 
brought before the Judge, and on the evidence of any medical 
or other witnesses, the Judge is satisfied-
(a) That the person is detained illegally in the hospital as a 
patient; or 
(b) That the J.erson is fit to be discharged from the 
hospit ,-
the Judge shall, unless the person is a special patient or is 
legally cfetained for some other cause, order that the person be 
discharged from the hospital forthwith. 
(4) If the person has been found to be under disability and is 
detained as a special patient by virtue of section I 15 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, and 1t appears to the satisfaction of 
the Judge that the person is capable of bein~ tried or 
committed for trial on the charge or indictment against him or 
her, the Judge shall (without prejudice to subsection (5) of this 
section) nave the same powers as the Attorney-General has 
under section 116 of that Act to direct that the person be 
brought before a Court under that section. 
(5) If the person has been found to be under disability and is 
detained as a special patient by virtue of section 1 I 5 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985, the Judge may, if in the 
circumstances of the case the Judge considers it proper to do so 
and if the interests of justice so pennit (whether or not the 
person is capable of being tried or committed for trial), direct 
that the charge or indictment be dismissed. 
(6) On giving any direction under subsection (5) of this 
section, the Judge may order that the person be released from 
compulsory status; but if it appears to the Judge that the person 
is not fit to be released from that status, the Judge shall order 
that the person be further detained in a hospital under this Act, 
and the last-mentioned order shall have effect as an_ inpatient 
order made under Part II of this Act. 
(7) For the purposes of any examination under this section, 
the Judge shall have power-
(a) To swnmon any medical or other witnesses to testify on 
oath in respect of any matter involved in the 
examination, and to produce any relevant 
documents; and 
(b) To call for any report on the person's condition by the 
Review Tribunal. 
(8) The Jud~e may in any case, if the Judge thinks fit_. _report 
. his or her opinion to the Mini~t er, with such comments ;u;d 
recommendations as the Judge thinks fit. ,.'':l , ;:·,." 'it •. ' ~~-='-.::!. ~:_ _ __ _ 
(9) Nothing in thie section ,lwl prevent the exercise of any 
other remetfy or proceeding available by or on behalf of any 
person who 15 or is alleged to be unlawfully detained, confined, 
or imprisoned. 
. ·-------------
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6) The Director may at any time amend or revoke any such 
de1e_gation, and no such delegation shall prevent the exercise or 
_performance of any power, duty, or furiction by the Director. 
(7) Without limiting any of the preceding provisions of this 
section, the Director-General of Health may exercise and 
perform all or any of the powers, duties, and functions 
conferred or imposed on the Director by this Act. 
Cf. 1969, No. 16, s. S; 1987, No. 10, s. 6 
92. Directors of Arca Mental Health Service•-(!) For 
the purposes of this Act, every Board shall appoint a Director of 
Area Mental Health Services. 
(2) Every Director of Arca Mental Health Services shall have 
the powers, duties, and functions conferred or imposed on the 
holder of that office by this Act. 
9S. Duly authori1ed officers-(!) For the purposes of this 
Act, every Board shall-
(a) Designate and authorise sufficient health professionals to 
perform at all times the fonctions and exercise the 
powers conferred on duly authorised officers by or 
under this Act; and 
(b) Maintain an appropriate directory listing of a telephone 
number to ring when information or .usistance is 
required under this Act. 
(2) No person shall be so designated and authorised under 
this section by a Board unless the Board is satisfied that the 
person has undergone appropriate training and h.u appropriate 
competence in dealing with persons who are mentally 
disordered. 
(S) Every person so designated and authorised under this 
section shall be issued with a document that identifies the 
holder and states that the holder is a duly authorised officer for 
the purposes of this Act. 
(4) Persons so designated and authorised under this section 
shall carry out their duties under the general direction of the 
Director of Area Mental Health SCTVices. 
94. Di1uict inapectora and official vi1itora-(l) For the 
purposes of this Act, the Minister shall appoint such number of 
persons as the Minister thinks fit to bc-
(a) District inspectors or deputy district inspectors; or 
(b) Official visitors-
\ 
' 
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in respect of such Board or Boards as the Minister may specify 
in the instruments of appointment. 
(2) No such person shall be a member or an employee of the 
Board or any of the Boards in respect of which the person is 
appointed. 
(S) The Minister shall appoint as district inspectors or as 
dcp~ty district inspectors only persons who arc barristers or 
so!icnors. 
(4) The Minister may from time to time, with the 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance, fix the remuneration of 
district inspectors, deputy district inspectors, and official 
visitors, either generally or in any particular case, and may, 
with the like concurrence, vary the amount or nature of such 
remuneration. 
(5) Every person appointed under this section shall hold office 
for a term of S years, but shall be eligible for reappointment 
from time to time. 
(6) Every district inspector, deputy district inspector, and 
official visitor shall have the powers, duties, and functions 
conferred or imposed on holders of those offices by this Act, 
and such other powers, duties, and functions as may be 
conferred or imposed on them by the Director in writing in, 
and for the purpose of dealing ,,..,ith, situations of urgency. 
Cf. 1969, No. 16, s. 5; 1982, No. 84, s. 2 (2) 
95. Inquiries by district inspector-(!) Every district 
inspector on any vim to any hospital or other service may, and 
shall if so required by the Director, inquire as to-
(a) Any breach of this Act or of any regulations made under 
this Act, or any breach of duty on the part of any 
officer or other person employed in the hospital or 
other service; and 
(b) Such other matters as the district inspector_ or the 
Director thinks fit to be inquired into respecting any 
patients, or the management of the hospital or other 
service. 
(2) For the purpose of conducting any inquiry under this Act, 
a district inspector shall have the same powers and authority to 
summon witnesses and receive evidence as arc conferred upon 
Corrunissions of Inquiry by the Corrunissions of Inquiry Act 
1908; and the provisions of that Act, except sections 11 and 12 
(which relate to costs), shall apply accordmgly. 
· (S) A full report of every such inquiry shall be sent as soon as 
practiablc by the district inspector to the Director. 
Cf. 1969, No. 16, s. 58 
;' 
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· 101. R"iew Tribunal1-(l) For the purposes of this Act, 
there shall be such number of Review Tribunals as the Minister 
may from time to time determine, each of which shall be 
appointed in respect of one or more specified Boards. 
(2) Every Review Tribunal shall comprise 3 {>ersons 
appointed bd the Minister, of whom I shall be a hamster or 
solicitor, an I shall be a psychiatrist. 
(3) No person shall act as a member of a Review Tribunal in 
any case where, given the identity of the patient, a conflict of 
interest may arise. 
(4) Subject to section 104 (2) of this Act, a Review Tribunal 
shail not be affected by any vacancy in its membership. 
10%. Function• and powen of Review Tribunals-
(!) The principal function of a Review Tribunal shall be to 
consider the condition of a patient who has applied for such a 
review, or in respect of whom an application for such a review 
has been made, under section 79 or section 80 of this Act. 
(2) A Review Tribunal may at any time, and shall whenever 
required by the Director to do so, report to the Director on any 
matter relating to the exercise or performance of iu powers 
and functions under this Act. 
(3) A Review Tribunal shall have all such other functions as 
are conferred on it by this Act or any other enactment. 
105. Co-opting ,uitable penona-(1) A Review Tribunal 
may, for the purposes of any particular case, co-opt-
(a) Any person whose specialised knowled~e or expertise 
would be of assistance to the ReVJew Tribunal in 
dealing with the case; or 
(b) Any person whose ethnic identity is the same as the 
patient's, where no member of the Review Tribunal 
has that ethnic identity; or 
(c) Any person of the same gender as the patient, where no 
member of the Review Tribunal is of that gender. 
(2) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (I) of this section, 
where in any case no member of the Review Tribunal has the 
same ethnic identity as the patient, or is of the same gender as 
the patient, the Review Tribunal shall co-opt a suitable person 
pursuant to paragraph (b) or paragraph (c) of that subsection if 
the patient or the applicant requests it to do so. 
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(3) A person who is co-opted under this section shall be 
deemed for all purposes to be a member of the Tribunal in 
respect of the case for which he or she is co-opted. 
104. Meetings and powers-(!) Meetings of a Review 
Tribunal shall be held at such times and places as the Review 
Tribunal or the convener appoints. 
(2) No business may be transacted at any meeting of a 
Review Tribunal Wlless each member, or his or her deputy, is 
present. 
(3) Every Review Tribunal shall have the same powers and 
authority to summon witnesses and receive evidence as are 
conferred upon Commissions of Inquiry by the Commissions of 
Inquiry Act 1908; and the proVJSions of that Act, except 
sections 11 and 12 (which relate to costs), shall apply 
accordingly. 
Further Provi.sionj Relating to Rroitw Tribuna/J 
105. Deputies of memben-(1) The Minister shall from 
time to time appoint persons to be deputies of members of 
each Review Tribunal. 
(2) The deputy of each member who is a barrister or solicitor 
shall also be a barrister or solicitor, and the deputy of each 
member who is a psychiatrist shall also be a psychiatrist. 
(3) Every deputy may act for the member for whom he ~r 
she is appointed during any period when that member IS 
incapacitated by illness, absence from New Zealand, or other 
sufficient cause from performing the duties of office, or during 
the absence of that member from any place at which a meeting 
of the Review Tribunal is to be held. 
(4) No deputy may act for more than I member at the same 
time. 
(5) Every deputy shall, while acting as such, be deemed to be 
a member of the Review Tribunal. 
(6) No acts done by a deputy as such, and no acts done ~y 
the Review Tribunal while any deputy is acting as such, shall m 
any proceedings be questioned on the ground that the occasion 
for the deputy to act had not arisen or had ceased. 
106. Tenns of office-(!) Every member of a Review 
Tribunal, and every deputy of any such member, shall hold 
office for such term, not exceeding 3 years, as may be specified 
in the instrument of appointment, but may from time to time 
be reappointed. 
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Section S2 FIRST SCHEDULE 
PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS RilATING TO REYl:Ew TRIBUNALS 
1. Examination of patient-Where a Review Tribunal is to review the 
condition of any patient under any of the provisions of Pan VIl of this Act, 
the convener, or some other member of the Tribunal nominated for the 
purpose by ~e convener, shall, as soon as practicable, examine the patient 
at the hospital, or the other place where the patient is undergoing 
treatment, or at such other suitable place as the convener or other 
member may determine, and may consult with such other persons as the 
convener or the member th.inb fit concerning the condition of the patient. 
2. Attendance of patient and other peraons-(1) The patient shall be 
present throughout the hearin~ by a Review Tribunal of an application for 
a review of the patient's condition unless-
(a) The convener or other member who examines the patient in 
accordance with clause l of this Schedule certifies that it would 
be in the best interests of the patient to excuse the patient from 
attending the hearing; or 
(b) The patient is excused or excluded by the Tribunal under subclause 
(2) or subclause (3) of this clause. 
(2) The Tribunal may excuse the patient if it is satisfied that the patient 
wholly lacks the capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the 
proceedings, or that attendance or continued attendance is lilely to cause 
the patient serious mental, emotional, or physical hann. 
(3) The Tribunal may exclude the patient ifit is satisfied that the patient 
is causing such a disturbance that it is not practicable to continue with the 
hearing in the presence of the patient. 
(4) The Tribunal may exercise, at any stage of the hearing,-
(a) The discretion conferred on it, by subclause (2) of this clause, to 
excuse a patient; or 
(b) The discretion conferred on it, by subclause (3) of this clause, to 
exclude a patient. 
(5) The patient shall be present while the Tribunal males any order 
upan the application unless-
(a) The patient has been excused or excluded under subclause (2) or 
subclause (3) of this clause; or 
(b) There are exceptional circumstances justifying the Tribunal making 
an order in the absence of the patient. 
(6) Any other person to whom a copy of the certificate of clinical review 
is sent under section 76 (7) (b) or section 7 7 (S) (b) of this Act shall be 
entitled to be present throughout the hearing, except as the convener may 
otherwise order. 
S. Right of patient and other penoru to be heard and call 
evidence-( l) The patient, and any person referred t<;> in clause 2 (6) <;>f 
this Schedule, shall be entitled to be heard _by the Tnbunal, whether m 
person or through a barrister or solicitor, and to call witnesses, ~d to 
cross-examine any witness called by any other party ~o the proceedings. 
(2) Without limiting anything in subclause (l) of~ clause,_ where the 
patient is present and appears capable of addressmg the Tnbunal, the 
• 
~ . 
Mental Health (Compulsory 
Asse.ssment and Treatment) 
FIRST SCHEDULE-continued 
85 
Tribunal shall give the patient an opportunity to do so; and, in any such 
case, the Tribunal may, if it thinks it desirable to do so, require any parent 
or guardian of the patient, or any other person with whom the patient is 
living, or any barrister or solicitor representing any such parent, guardian, 
or other person, to withdraw from the Tribunal while the patient is 
addressing the Tribunal. 
•· Tribunal may call for report on patient-(!) A Review Tribunal 
may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary for the proper review of a patient's 
condition, request any person whom it considers qualified to do so to 
prepare a medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other repon on the 
pauent. 
(2) In deciding whether or not to request a repon under subclause (I) of 
this clause, the Tribunal may ascertain and have regard to the wishes of 
the patient and any other party to the proceedings. 
(3) A copy of any repon obtained under this section shall be given by the 
convener of the Tribunal to the barrister or solicitor for the patient and for 
each of the other parties to the proceedings or, if any party is not 
represented by a barrister or solicitor, to that party. 
(4) The Tribunal shall order that a copy of a repon given to a barrister 
or solicitor under subclause (3) of this clause shall not be given or shown to 
the person for whom the barrister or solicitor is acting if the Tribunal has 
reason to believe that such disclosure of the contents of the repon may 
pose a serious threat to the health or safety of the patient or of any other 
person. 
(5) Where any person prepares a repon pursuant to a request under 
subclause (I) of this clause, the fees and expenses of that person shall be 
paid by such party or panics to the proceedings as the Tribunal shall order 
or, if the Tribunal so decides, shall be paid out of public money 
appropriated by Parliament for the purpose. 
(6) Any party to the proceedings may tender evidence on any matter 
ref erred to in any such report. 
(7) The Tribunal may call the person making the repon as a wimess, 
either of its O"-"Il motion or on the application of any party to the 
proceedings. 
5. Evidence-For the purposes of any review of a patient's condition, a 
Review Tribunal may receive any evidence that it thinb fit, whether it is 
admissible in a court of law or noL 
6. Power of Tribunal to call witne11es-(l) Without limiting anything 
in clause 5 of this Schedule, for the purposes of a review of a patient's 
condition, a Review Tribunal may, of its own motion, call a.5 a wimess any 
person whose evidence may, in its opinion, be of a.Jsistance to the 
Tribunal. 
(2) A wimess called by the Tribunal ~der this c~use shall have the ~ame 
privilege to refuse to answer any quesuon as the wi.tness would have if the 
vdmess had been called by a party to the proceedings. 
(3) A witness called by the Tribunal under this clause ma~ be examined 
and re·examined by the Tribunal, and may be cross,ex.arruned by or on 
behalf of any p~y to the proceedings. 
.~ /:.·; •' •. • •.: I~':• ~ ·i', • ,. ... J, 
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(4) Sections 20, !8, and !9 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, so far 
as they are applicable and with the necessary modifiCAtions, shall apply 
with respect to every person called as a wimess by the Tribunal under this 
clause as if that ~n had been called by a party to the proceedings. 
(5) The expenses of any wimess called by the Tribunal under this clause 
shalf be paid in the first instance, in accordance with the prescribed scale of 
witnesses' expenses, out of public money appropriated by Parliament for 
the purpose. 
7. Proceedings not open to public-(1) No person shall be present 
during any proceedings before a Review Tribunal except the following: 
(a) Members and staff of the Tribunal: 
(b) Parties to the proceedings and their barristers and solicitors: 
(c) Wimesses: 
(d) Any person referred to in clause 2 (6) of this Schedule: 
(e) Any other ~on whom the convener permits to be prescnL 
(2) Any witness shall withdraw from the Tnbun.al if asked to do so by the 
convener. · 
8. Restriction of publication of reports of proceedings-(1) No 
person shall publish any repon of proceedings before a Review Tribunal 
except with the leave of the Triburial. 
(2) Nothing in subclause (1) ofthis clause shall apply to the publication of 
any repon in any publication that-
(a) ls of a bona fide professional or technical nature; and 
(b) Is intended for arculation among members of the legal or medical 
professions, employees of the Health Service or the Department 
of Health, psychologists, or social workers. 
9. Tribunal may disperue with hearing in certain ci.rcunutances-
Notwithstanding any of the preceding provisions of this Schedule, a 
Review Tribunal may review a patient's condition without a formal hearing 
if it is satisfied that no person ·wishes to be heard in respect of the review. 
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